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DOES IDEOLOGY MATTER IN BANKRUPTCY? VOTING
BEHAVIOR ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS
JONATHAN REMY NASH* & RAFAEL I. PARDO**
ABSTRACT
This Article empirically examines whether courts of appeals
judges cast ideological votes in the bankruptcy context. The empiri-
cal study is unique insofar as it is the first to examine the voting
behavior of circuit court judges in bankruptcy cases. More impor-
tantly, it focuses on a particular type of dispute that arises in
bankruptcy: debt-dischargeability determinations. The study imple-
ments this focused approach in order to reduce heterogeneity in
result. We find, contrary to our hypotheses, no evidence that circuit
court judges engage in ideological voting in bankruptcy cases. We
also find, however, non-ideological factors—including the race of the
judge and the disposition of the case by lower courts—that substan-
tially influence the voting pattern of the judges in our study.
The Article makes three broad contributions. First, it indicates
that bankruptcy voting is comparatively non-ideological, at least at
the level of the courts of appeals. Second, by identifying the influence
of certain nonideological factors on voting behavior, the Article
suggests avenues for profitable future research. And third, the
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Article makes a methodological contribution through its fine-grained
approach, which demonstrates the importance of focusing on
particular legal issues in order to reduce heterogeneity in, and
bolster the reliability of, findings from empirical legal studies. 
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INTRODUCTION
In 1935, legal historian Charles Warren proclaimed that, al-
though the history of bankruptcy legislation is “colorful,” “[t]he law
of bankruptcy is a dry and discouraging topic.”1 Forty-six years
later, in his opinion dissenting from the Court’s order denying a
petition for writ of certiorari in a bankruptcy case, then-Justice
William Rehnquist penned the following introductory words, which
echoed Warren’s proclamation:
Bankruptcy cases seldom receive much notice outside of those
who are familiar with this branch of the law, and it is therefore
understandable that there is a dearth of recent bankruptcy
precedents decided on the merits in this Court as compared with
constitutional cases, labor cases, and other more alluring
subjects.2
All of this might lead one to believe that “bankruptcy is a
hypertechnical, code-based, number-crunching field of law where
ideology has no role to play.”3 Commentators have found evidence
of ideological voting in other contexts among U.S. federal courts of
appeals judges.4 Yet even these commentators speculate that
bankruptcy is a field that may not draw out ideological voting.5 
1. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 3 (Beard Books 1999)
(1935).
2. New Jersey v. Reading Co., 451 U.S. 918, 918 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
3. Rafael I. Pardo, The Utility of Opacity in Judicial Selection, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 633, 642 (2009).
4. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV.
1717, 1718-20 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304-06
(2004).
5. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 16 (2006) (“Might
ideological voting and panel effects be found in apparently nonideological cases involving, for
example, bankruptcy, torts, and civil procedure?”); see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 842 (2008) (“Many areas of law
remain entirely unstudied in the standard terms, including, for example, antitrust,
intellectual property, and bankruptcy. It would be useful to know in which areas of law and
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In this Article, we examine whether judges cast ideological votes
in the bankruptcy context. We hypothesize that ideology influences
voting in the bankruptcy context and draw on empirical evidence to
evaluate our hypothesis.
Although many studies of ideological voting look broadly at cases
falling within a subject matter—for example, all tax cases6—our
empirical study examines a particular type of dispute that arises in
bankruptcy. We opt for such a focused approach in order to reduce
heterogeneity in result. It is quite possible that a study that sweeps
in cases that raise large numbers of varied issues may reduce our
ability to conclude how often ideological voting is occurring and
indeed whether it is occurring at all. 
Our study focuses on disputes involving the scope of an individ-
ual debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy—specifically, whether a cer-
tain debt falls within the category of debts that Congress has
defined as nondischargeable. We have chosen to study this subset
of litigation for two reasons. First, forgiveness of debt constitutes
the core substantive relief that bankruptcy law affords debtors
and embodies the “fresh start” rationale that animates the law.7
Whether to grant a debtor a discharge, and thus frustrate creditors’
collection efforts, would seem to be highly ideologically charged. In
short, if there is ideological voting in bankruptcy, this would seem
to be a good place to find it. Second, deciding whether to discharge
debt pits debtors against creditors in a predictable way. We thus
avoid conflating ideological voting over debtor-creditor disputes
with ideological voting over intra-creditor disputes, such as disputes
between secured and unsecured creditors. 
In the end, we find, contrary to our hypotheses, no evidence that
ideological voting arises in voting by courts of appeals judges8 in
bankruptcy cases. We do find, however, other nonideological factors
that influence circuit court judges’ bankruptcy voting. For example,
under what circumstances the judicial personality has the greatest (and the least) influence
on decisions.”). 
6. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of
Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2006).
7. See infra notes 56-57.
8. We use the phrases “courts of appeals judges” and “circuit court judges” broadly to
refer to any judge sitting on a three-judge panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals, whether a judge
of that court or a judge, including a federal district court judge, sitting by designation. See
infra note 139.
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the race of the judge and the disposition of the case by the lower
courts are substantial influences on how courts of appeals judges
vote. 
This Article makes three broad contributions. First, it refutes the
notion that ideological voting is rampant in bankruptcy. If any-
thing, it lends support to the view that bankruptcy voting is
comparatively nonideological, at least at the level of the courts of
appeals. 
Second, the Article identifies nonideological factors that do
influence how circuit judges vote in bankruptcy. This suggests
avenues for profitable future research, both in bankruptcy and
beyond.
Third, the Article makes the methodological contribution of
emphasizing the importance of focusing on particular legal issues
in order to reduce heterogeneity in empirical legal studies. Many
empirical studies of judicial voting are susceptible to the criticism
that their broad scope reduces the reliability of their findings. We
endeavor to ameliorate this complaint by taking a more fine-grained
approach.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we explicate the role
that ideology might play in resolving disputes arising in bank-
ruptcy. In light of speculation by some commentators that bank-
ruptcy is comparatively nonideological, we consider two bases for
that conclusion: the technical nature of bankruptcy law and the
specialization of lower court judges who hear bankruptcy cases. We
develop hypotheses for testing whether the ideological preferences
of judges on the courts of appeals influence their votes in bank-
ruptcy cases.
In Part II, we present our empirical study. We first explain our
rationale for focusing on a single type of case—a debt-discharge-
ability determination in consumer bankruptcy cases. We then
discuss the method by which we gathered our data. After that, we
report and discuss our findings. Although we find statistically
significant predictors of voting behavior in the study sample, the
ideological preference of a judge is not among those predictors.
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I. BANKRUPTCY AND IDEOLOGY
Scholars have analyzed courts of appeals voting and found that
circuit judges engage in ideological voting.9 They have also discov-
ered evidence of panel effects on federal courts of appeals—that is,
the tendency of a judge to vote differently depending on the
ideological preferences of the other judges on the panel with whom
the voting judge sits.10
There are two reasons that, notwithstanding evidence of ideo-
logical voting in other areas, one might not expect to find ideological
voting—or as robust ideological voting—in the bankruptcy context.
We examine, and critique, those arguments here. 
A. Subject Matter of Cases
Following up on Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth’s evidence of
ideological voting among Supreme Court Justices in the civil
liberties area,11 some commentators have found evidence of ideo-
logical voting even in areas often considered to be more techni-
cal—and perhaps therefore less ideological—in nature.12 On the
9. We mean to refer to ideological voting as voting in line with certain preferences. See,
e.g., CROSS, supra note 4, at 13 (“Judicial ideology generally does not mean partisan politics.
An ideological judicial activist does not have his political party’s interests at heart, according
to the attitudinal model. Instead, the judge has a personal ideology, on a two-dimensional
liberal to conservative scale, that drives his or her rulings. Such judges are presumed not to
be involved in political bargaining or lobbying within the court or with members of the other
branches of government, but are sincerely voting their personal preferences, conservative or
liberal.”). We recognize that other incentives may lead judges to cast votes for other
nonideological, but also nonlegal, reasons. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping
Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1182 (2006).
10. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (discussing panel effects); Revesz, supra note
4, at 1751-56 (same). 
11. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 312-26 (2002).
12. See Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized
Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839,
855-57 (2009) (finding evidence of ideological voting in patent cases at the Federal Circuit);
Staudt et al., supra note 6, at 1800 (finding evidence of ideological voting in tax cases at the
Supreme Court).
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other hand, other commentators have found that some more
technical areas exhibit comparatively less ideological voting.13
Along these lines, some commentators have suggested that
bankruptcy cases differ fundamentally from other areas in terms of
the frequency with which politically polarizing issues arise.14 The
assumption here seems to be that bankruptcy, as a field, is com-
paratively nonideological. Note that this assumption does not turn
on the ideological bent of circuit court judges; the point is simply
that the issues that tend to arise in bankruptcy cases do not invite
ideological disagreement and therefore do not invite ideological
voting.15 On this reasoning, ideological voting in bankruptcy cases
is less frequent simply because issues that invite such voting arise
less frequently.16
To the extent that this argument suggests that the field of
bankruptcy is nearly devoid of ideologically charged topics, we do
not find this reasoning terribly persuasive. It is conceivable that
one has to look harder for divisive issues in bankruptcy, but they
are surely there.17 Nor is it at all clear to us that politically
13. See Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 261, 270, 278 (1996) (finding no evidence of ideological voting by Supreme Court Justices
in tax and federalism cases and only limited evidence of such voting by the Justices in union
cases); Wendy L. Hansen, Renée J. Johnson & Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts, Bureaucratic
Agencies, and the Politics of U.S. Trade Policy, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 529, 546 (1995) (finding
weak evidence of ideological voting in international trade cases at the Court of International
Trade).
14. See, e.g., David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments,
86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1072 (2008)  (reviewing JAN CRAWFORD, SUPREME CONFLICT (2007)) (“If
the federal courts decided issues solely of technical federal law, such as tax, bankruptcy, and
even federal-preemption cases, the judicial appointments process would hardly be
controversial except in extreme and rare cases.”).
15. Cf. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Crystals, Mud, BAPCPA, and the Structure of Bankruptcy
Decisionmaking, 71 MO. L. REV. 1069, 1076 n.27 (2006) (“One might posit that bankruptcy
cases are most likely to produce statutory interpretation questions of a type that would be
relatively uninteresting to generalist judges.”).
16. Cf. CROSS, supra note 4, at 20 (“Political science researchers have developed a
consistent system of coding judicial decisions for whether they were liberal or conservative.
The accuracy of this system surely varies by type of case, as some technical disputes have no
clear ideological significance.”).
17. See Staudt et al., supra note 6, at 1799 (“[W]hy do judges appear to stand above
politics in the areas of the law that are rife with conflict and controversy in the other two
branches of government? Lawmaking in the context of taxation, bankruptcy, securities,
antitrust, and corporate law, to name just a few examples, is highly political in both the
legislative and executive branches, as many empirical scholars have documented. For this
reason, we seriously question the claim that judges are unique in that they have no political
2012] DOES IDEOLOGY MATTER IN BANKRUPTCY? 927
controversial issues in bankruptcy are so few and far behind as
these commentators implicitly suggest. The creditor-debtor divide
pervades bankruptcy, a divide that James Madison categorized as
a “common and durable source of faction[ ]” necessitating govern-
ment regulation.18 Indeed, in an experimental study involving
hypothetical cases, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew
Wistrich found empirical evidence that bankruptcy judges tend to
cast votes in either pro-creditor or pro-debtor directions based on
their self-reported political affiliation.19
In sum, to the extent that the argument is that bankruptcy is
essentially devoid of issues over which judges divide ideologically,
we flatly disagree. Although it may be that courts of appeals con-
front ideologically charged issues less frequently in bankruptcy
cases, our suspicion nonetheless is that there are far more such
or ideological preferences when it comes to business and finance. Our hypothesis is that the
null findings in the literature are due to the technical difficulties associated with uncovering
politics in large-n quantitative studies addressing economic decision making, rather than to
a lack of judicial interest in these issues.” (footnote omitted)); see also Pardo, supra note 3,
at 643-44 (citing the partisan divide in congressional voting on the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 as an “example illustrat[ing] how the scope
of substantive relief in bankruptcy and the role of judges within the bankruptcy system are
partisan issues”).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Belknap Press 2009) (“But the most
common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of
property.... Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like
discrimination.... The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.”). We thank Hanah Volokh for
bringing this passage to our attention.
19. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy
Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1236, 1247-48, 1257-58 (2006) (finding some statistically
significant differences in terms of judges’ party affiliation and voting on issues—in particular
that Republican judges tend to be more pro-creditor—with party affiliation measured based
on self-reporting). Furthermore, various studies have documented statistically significant
associations between certain bankruptcy outcomes, whether pro-debtor or pro-creditor, and
the identity of the bankruptcy judge to whom the matter was assigned. E.g., Scott F. Norberg
& Nadja Schreiber Compo, Report on an Empirical Study of District Variations, and the
Roles of Judges, Trustees and Debtors’ Attorneys in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, 81 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 431, 458-63 (2007) (dismissal and discharge rates in Chapter 13 cases); Rafael
I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge
Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 223-34 (2009) (debt-dischargeability determinations
involving student loans); Tom Chang & Antoinette Schoar, Judge Specific Differences in
Chapter 11 and Firm Outcomes 2-4 (Nov. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http: / /personal.anderson.ucla .edu/po l icy.area/seminars/winter2009/chang/
tomchangpaper.pdf.
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issues that arise in bankruptcy on a regular basis than most people
think.20
B. Specialization in the Lower Courts in Bankruptcy Cases
Bankruptcy cases also differ from many other cases that arrive
at the courts of appeals in that the lower courts that handle the
cases almost always include some specialized judges. Indeed, in
some cases, only judges who specialize in bankruptcy will have
heard the case below.21 
Original bankruptcy jurisdiction is technically vested in the U.S.
district courts.22 The statute anticipates, however, that the district
courts may enter “standing orders” that refer bankruptcy matters
to bankruptcy judges.23 Bankruptcy judges are Article I judges
appointed by the court of appeals;24 they inevitably have consider-
able experience in bankruptcy. 
Core proceedings that “arise in” or “arise under” the Bankruptcy
Code25 constitute the overwhelming majority of disputes in bank-
20. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 4 (1986)
(“The policy relating to discharge and notions of a fresh start ... addresses the question of
whether limits should be established on what creditors can get from their debtor.”); William
O. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies—State vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591, 592-93
(1933) (“The bankruptcy power in general entails a determination of legislative policy on two
problems.... The second problem entails primarily a determination of the debts from which
a debtor may be discharged, the conditions if any for a discharge, and the grounds upon
which it may be refused.”); Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives
in the Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1233-34 (2010) (“[I]n bankruptcy,
the particular rules are not neutral because societal and economic factors larger than the
mere preferences of private parties are at stake.”); Bruce H. Mann, Failure in the Land of the
Free, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (“Whether a society forgives its debtors and how it
bestows or withholds forgiveness are more than matters of economic or legal consequence.
They go to the heart of what a society values.”). 
21. The following discussion draws on Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An
Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate
Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745 (2008). 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b) (2006).
23. § 157(a).
24. § 152(a)(1).
25. This Article uses the terms “Bankruptcy Code” and “Code” to refer to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended primarily at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006)).
2012] DOES IDEOLOGY MATTER IN BANKRUPTCY? 929
ruptcy cases. Congress has authorized bankruptcy judges to rule
definitively on such proceedings in the first instance.26 
From a bankruptcy court ruling, a losing party may appeal to the
district court,27 then to the court of appeals, and thereafter seek
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.28 But that is not the only
appellate path that Congress has authorized. Congress has also
invited each court of appeals to create a “bankruptcy appellate
panel” (BAP).29 The members of the BAP are themselves bank-
ruptcy judges—that is, judges trained in bankruptcy.30 BAPs are
authorized to hear appeals from bankruptcy courts to the extent
that no party objects to BAP jurisdiction.31 Thus, any party may
assert a right to have an appeal heard by the district court.32
However, if no one does, then a lone bankruptcy judge will hear the
core proceeding first, followed by a BAP hearing; in other words,
only specialist judges trained in bankruptcy will have heard the
case before it reaches the court of appeals.
Commentators have uncovered evidence that specialized judges
still may engage in ideological voting.33 In the setting of bankruptcy
cases heard by the court of appeals, however, we are faced with
generalist judges voting in cases that specialist judges have already
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (referring to “core proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in a case under title 11”). In turn, § 157(b)(2) lists examples of core proceedings,
which include matters concerning estate administration, claim allowance, discharge
objections, and plan confirmation. Bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to
definitively resolve such proceedings in the first instance, with appellate review to follow.
§ 157(b)(1). The constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to definitively resolve all such
proceedings, however, has recently been called into question. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (holding that the bankruptcy court “lacked the constitutional authority
to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of
ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim”). Finally, if a district court has withdrawn the reference
to the bankruptcy court, then the district court will hear the matter in the first instance. See
§ 157(d). 
27. § 158(c)(1).




32. See § 158(c)(1).
33. See Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts and
General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135 (2005) (finding greater
ideological voting in tax cases heard by the specialized judges of the U.S. Tax Court than by
generalist federal district court judges); Miller & Curry, supra note 12 (Federal Circuit
judges); Rachlinski et al., supra note 19 (bankruptcy judges).
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heard. We concede that circuit court judges may be inclined to
abandon pure ideological voting and instead to defer to the exper-
tise of the specialist judges who decided the case below.34 
The alternate first-tier appellate courts—district courts and
BAPs—offer a natural experiment. To the extent that circuit judges
are less likely to vote their own ideologies when they defer to
specialist judges below, we would expect less ideological voting at
the court of appeals level in cases that have been heard by BAPs—
and therefore only by specialist judges below—than in cases that
have been heard by district judges—and therefore only by a lone
specialist bankruptcy judge. The appellate structure in the bank-
ruptcy system is depicted below in Figure 1.35
34. Cf. Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts of Appeals’ Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the
Politics of Protectionism, 50 POL. RES. Q. 851, 863 (1997) (finding that the Federal Circuit
was generally deferential to agency findings in cases originating at both the International
Trade Commission (ITC) and the Department of Commerce, although more so to the ITC).
It may be that the bankruptcy judges and BAP judges who hear the cases below decide
cases ideologically. Cf. Freyermuth, supra note 15, at 1076 n.27 (“[O]ne might expect that
BAP judges—who are more frequent participants within the bankruptcy system—might
produce more engaged decisionmaking than generalist appellate judges.”). But see Pardo,
supra note 3, at 644-45 (“Unfortunately, very little research exists that has empirically
examined whether decisionmaking by bankruptcy judges can be characterized as ideological.
The research that does exist on the subject provides limited and mixed evidence that
prevents a definitive conclusion from being drawn either way. The views expressed by other
bankruptcy scholars, however, suggest that the bankruptcy bench is unlikely to be
ideological.” (footnotes omitted)). 
Given this possibility, one might distinguish between two types of deference by court of
appeals judges—expertise deference and ideological deference. If court of appeals judges
simply defer to the specialized judges below on the basis of their expert decision making,
then the court of appeals judges do not vote ideologically. If, on the other hand, the court of
appeals judges defer based on the perception that the ideological preferences of the
specialized judges below are aligned with their own ideological preferences, one might
categorize such deference as ideological. For commentary exploring the possibility that courts
of appeals judges may appoint bankruptcy judges whose ideological preferences mirror their
own, see Pardo, supra note 3, at 648-51.
35. A third possible appellate path—that of direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to
the court of appeals—exists for a limited set of circumstances. Appeal may proceed directly
to the court of appeals pursuant to a certification procedure if one of the following
circumstances exists: (1) the appeal involves a question of law unresolved by the court of
appeals for the circuit or by the Supreme Court; (2) the appeal involves a matter of public
importance; (3) the appeal involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting
decisions; or (4) the appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in
which the appeal is taken. See § 158(d)(2)(A).
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Figure 1
   Federal Bankruptcy Appellate Structure for 
Core Proceedings
* * *
From the foregoing, we derive and empirically test the following
hypotheses. 
First, because we are dubious that bankruptcy is devoid of
ideological content, and because we doubt that the presence of
expert lower-court judges removes all incentives for circuit court
judges to vote ideologically, we anticipate finding evidence of circuit
court judges voting ideologically in bankruptcy cases. 
• Hypothesis 1. Circuit court judges will exhibit ideological
voting in bankruptcy cases.
Second, Hypothesis 1 notwithstanding, we do believe that having
a case heard by a BAP as opposed to by a district court at the first
First-Tier 
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tier of intermediate appellate review—and thus having a case heard
by four experts in bankruptcy law before the case reaches the court
of appeals—will reduce the incentive for circuit judges to vote
ideologically.
• Hypothesis 2.  Ideological voting by circuit court judges will
be more muted in cases that actually are heard by BAPs as
opposed to those that are not.
Third, in keeping with Hypothesis 1’s prediction of ideological
voting by circuit court judges in bankruptcy cases, we anticipate
that such judges will be subject to panel effects—that is, their
voting behavior will be influenced by the ideologies of the other
judges who sit on panels with them—just as commentators have
found in other areas of the law.
• Hypothesis 3.  Circuit court judges will be subject to panel
effects in bankruptcy cases.
II. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN BANKRUPTCY: A CASE STUDY IN
DEBT-DISCHARGEABILITY DETERMINATIONS
To test our hypotheses regarding the relationship between
ideology and the voting behavior of courts of appeals judges in
bankruptcy cases, we focus our investigation on a subset of
cases—specifically, determinations of whether a particular type of
debt was excepted from an individual debtor’s discharge, which we
refer to as “debt-dischargeability determinations.” We focus on a
particular type of bankruptcy issue in order to render our dataset
more homogeneous, and thus to render our results more reliable.
We choose to focus on debt-dischargeability determinations because,
insofar as they pit debtors against creditors and directly raise the
“fresh start” rationale for bankruptcy, they are a likely place to find
ideological voting to the extent there is any.
Part II.A situates debt-dischargeability determinations within
bankruptcy law and litigation. Part II.B describes our data-
collection procedures. Part II.C sets forth summary statistics and
bivariate analyses of the data included in our study. Part II.D
reports the findings from our multivariate logistic regression model
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for predicting judicial voting behavior in the collected cases. Finally,
Part II.E interprets our results.
A. Debt-Dischargeability Determinations
To place our subset of cases in the proper context, it is important
to understand that, although formally a judicial process, bank-
ruptcy has been and continues to be substantively administrative
in nature.36 For a debtor to voluntarily obtain relief, he or she must
file a petition under one of the operative chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code—for example, Chapter 7.37 The case itself is an administrative
proceeding within which disputes may, but need not, arise.38 The
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Bankruptcy Rules) sort
disputes into one of two categories: adversary proceedings or con-
tested matters. The former resemble other federal lawsuits insofar
as the Bankruptcy Rules governing such proceedings virtually
incorporate, with occasional modification, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.39 The Bankruptcy Rules categorize only a limited num-
ber of disputes as adversary proceedings,40 including any proceeding
to determine the dischargeability of a debt.41 If a dispute does not
constitute an adversary proceeding, it is deemed to be a “contested
matter” and proceeds according to less complex procedures than an
adversary proceeding.42 For example, a party can request relief by
motion in a contested matter,43 whereas a party can commence an
adversary proceeding only by filing a complaint.44
36. See Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L.
REV. 963, 965-68 (1993).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
38. Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 910 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); cf. S. REP.
NO. 95-989, at 31 (1978) (“The term adjudication is replaced by [order for relief] in light of
the clear power of Congress to permit voluntary bankruptcy without the necessity for an
adjudication, as under the 1898 act, which was adopted when voluntary bankruptcy was a
concept not thoroughly tested.”), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5817.
39. See FED. R. BANKR. P. pt. VII.
40. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
41. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).
42. See Khachikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 125 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)
(“In a contested matter, there is no summons and complaint, pleading rules are relaxed,
counterclaims and third-party practice do not apply, and much pre-trial procedure is either
foreshortened or dispensed with in the interest of time and simplicity.”).
43. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a).
44. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003.
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In addition to procedural distinctions in the types of disputes that
arise in a bankruptcy case, the disputes themselves involve a
variety of litigants—for example, debtors, creditors, the bankruptcy
trustee, and the U.S. Trustee—and subject areas. The diversity of
disputes and litigants will partly be a function of whether the case
involves an individual debtor—that is, a consumer case—or a
nonindividual debtor—that is, a business case. The following
description illustrates the nature and extent of disputes that can
arise in the context of a consumer case.
First, consider disputes involving a consumer debtor. A debtor
who seeks a fresh start from his or her past debts may encounter
opposition from creditors who object to the property that the debtor
claims as exempt from the bankruptcy process,45 from creditors who
assert that the debts owed to them are nondischargeable,46 or from
creditors who assert that the debtor is not entitled to a discharge of
any of his or her debts.47 A debtor may end up litigating against
creditors who continue their collection efforts in contravention of
the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay or discharge injunction,48 and
a debtor may also encounter motions to dismiss the bankruptcy
case.49 
Next, consider disputes between and among creditors. Because
of the common pool problem that arises when a debtor has insuffi-
cient assets to pay creditor claims in full,50 creditors will litigate
against one another, jockeying for a position that will increase the
distribution the creditor receives on account of its claim against the
debtor. Such litigation may include challenges by unsecured cred-
itors against secured creditors51 and challenges by unsecured
creditors against other unsecured creditors.52 For the bankruptcy
trustee charged with administering the debtor’s estate,53 he or she
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006).
46. See § 523.
47. See, e.g., § 727(a).
48. See §§ 362(a), 524(a).
49. See, e.g., §§ 707, 1112, 1307. 
50. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 7-19. 
51. See § 506(a). Creditors with allowed secured claims are entitled to distribution from
estate property prior to creditors with allowed unsecured claims. See, e.g., §§ 725, 726(a).
52. See, e.g., §§ 507(a), 726(a).
53. See, e.g., § 704(a). The following description from the legislative history to the
Bankruptcy Code nicely summarizes the role of a Chapter 7 trustee:
The trustee’s principal duty is to collect and reduce to money the property of
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may challenge the claims of both secured and unsecured creditors
in an attempt to enlarge the distribution available for creditors
whose claims the trustee considers to be valid.54 The trustee may
also litigate against the debtor, again representing the interests of
the estate.55
The heterogeneity and permutations of litigants and disputes
throughout the life of a bankruptcy case demand careful attention
in designing an empirical study of the voting behavior of circuit
court judges who decide bankruptcy appeals. Beyond differences in
the procedural nature, litigant identity, and subject matter of
bankruptcy disputes, one must also be mindful of a variety of other
considerations that could influence statistical analyses and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom—considerations such as potential
selection effects in the decision to bring an appeal, burdens of proof,
and standards of appellate review. In order to reduce the problems
associated with controlling for heterogeneity across cases, prudence
dictates confining our investigation to a specific subset of cases. By
doing so, we can largely minimize the above-referenced concerns.
Our focus is on disputes that arise in consumer cases and that
involve a determination of the dischargeability of a particular type
of debt. The bankruptcy discharge is the core mechanism that
effectuates the fresh-start policy in bankruptcy56—that is, restoring
to economic productivity a debtor who suffers from financial
distress.57 As a general matter, the Bankruptcy Code assigns a lim-
ited monitoring role to the court in determining discharge eligibility
and does not invite inquiry as to whether a debtor’s particular
the estate for which he serves, and to close up the estate as expeditiously as is
compatible with the best interests of parties in interest. He must be accountable
for all property received, and must investigate the financial affairs of the
debtor. If a purpose would be served (such as if there are assets that will be
distributed), the trustee is required to examine proofs of claims and object to
the allowance of any claim that is improper. If advisable, the trustee must
oppose the discharge of the debtor, which is for the benefit of general unsecured
creditors whom the trustee represents.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 344 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6335.
54. See, e.g., § 704(a)(5).
55. See, e.g., §§ 704(a)(6), 707(b).
56. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts:
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 415-16
& n.39 (2005).
57. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 56, at 414.
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circumstances warrant forgiveness of debt.58 For example, in
Chapter 7 cases, a court must grant an individual debtor a dis-
charge unless the debtor falls within a particular class of individ-
ual, generally defined by reference to a limited set of circumstances
relating to debtor fraud or misconduct in connection with the
bankruptcy case.59 The court is not an autonomous entity and must
be prompted into action by a party in interest.60 Even if a basis
exists for denying the debtor’s discharge, failure of the party in
interest—such as a creditor, the trustee, or the U.S. Trustee61—to
file a complaint objecting to discharge within the time prescribed by
the Bankruptcy Rules will preclude denial of the discharge, unless
procedural considerations warrant otherwise.62 Without such
58. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV.
99, 128 (1990); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 363 (1991); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 6 (1978) (“At the heart of
the fresh start provisions of the bankruptcy law is section 727 covering discharge. The
discharge provisions require the court to grant the debtor a discharge of all his debts except
for very specific and serious infractions on his part.”), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5793. The exception is the Chapter 13 “hardship discharge,” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 392
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6386, which requires a finding, among others,
that “the debtor’s failure to complete such payments was due to circumstances for which the
debtor should not justly be held accountable,” § 1328(b)(1). See Pardo & Lacey, supra note
56, at 516.
59. See § 727(a) (setting forth twelve grounds for denial of a Chapter 7 discharge). In
Chapter 13, the grounds for denial of discharge are substantially more limited. A Chapter
13 debtor may be denied a discharge only if he or she has failed to complete all payments
under the repayment plan, § 1328(a), and does not qualify for a hardship discharge,
§ 1328(b); or, under certain circumstances, if the debtor received a discharge in a prior
bankruptcy case, § 1328(f); or if the debtor has failed to complete a personal financial
management instructional course, § 1328(g)(1). 
60. See In re Harmon, 324 B.R. 383, 387 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
61. § 727(c)(1). The U.S. Trustee, supervised by the U.S. Attorney General, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 586(c) (2006), has various duties, including the establishment and supervision of a panel
of private trustees who will serve in cases under the various chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code, see § 586(a)(1); monitoring the administration of cases, see § 586(a)(3); performing the
duties of a private trustee when required to do so, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); 28 U.S.C.
§ 586(a)(2); reviewing—and objecting to when appropriate—applications for compensation
and reimbursement of fees and expenses, see 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A); and monitoring
repayment plans under Chapters 11, 12 and 13, see § 586(a)(3)(B), (C).
62. Examples include an extension of time or a pending motion to dismiss the case. See
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004; In re Harmon, 324 B.R. at 386-89. The procedural deadline for filing
a complaint objecting to discharge is, however, a claim-processing rule that the debtor will
forfeit if he or she fails to timely assert it as an affirmative defense. See Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U.S. 443, 456-60 (2004). Also, a court may revoke a Chapter 7 discharge if the debtor
obtained it fraudulently and the party requesting revocation lacked knowledge of the fraud
when the discharge was originally granted. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1).
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prompting, the debtor will automatically be granted a discharge
without any inquiry by the court.63
Upon receiving a discharge, the debtor will be released from
personal liability on all discharged debts.64 In its most expansive
form, the discharge would extend to all prebankruptcy debts,
regardless of the identity of the creditors to whom the debts were
owed or the circumstances under which such debts were incurred.
But the reality is that our bankruptcy law has never provided an
absolute discharge. Time and time again, society has determined
that the repayment of certain types of debts ought to trump debtor
relief. The manner in which the scope of debtor relief is tailored
mirrors the normative judgments regarding the extent to which
society desires to facilitate “a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort”65 for individuals who seek debt relief through
the bankruptcy system.66 
A review of the historical record reveals Congress’s ongoing
tendency to carve out more and more exceptions to the discharge in
bankruptcy. Initially, very few debts were nondischargeable. Under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, repealed in 1803, only debts owing to
the federal government or state governments were excepted from
discharge.67 Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, repealed in 1843,
only debts resulting from defalcation by the debtor while acting as
a public officer or in a fiduciary capacity did not qualify for dis-
charge.68 Somewhat similarly, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867,
repealed in 1878, any debt “created by the fraud or embezzlement
of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while
acting in any fiduciary character” fell outside the scope of dis-
charge.69 
Congress, however, changed its approach to the scope of dis-
charge with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, repealed in 1978, by
broadening the categories of nondischargeable debt to include tax
debts; judgment debts “for frauds, or obtaining property by false
63. In re Harmon, 324 B.R. at 387.
64. See § 524(a)(2).
65. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
66. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM 1 (paperback ed. 1999); Mann, supra note 20, at 1.
67. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 62, 2 Stat. 19, 36 (repealed 1803).
68. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843).
69. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878).
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pretenses or false representations, or for willful and malicious
injuries to the person or property of another;” unscheduled debts;
and debts arising from the debtor’s fraud.70 One might attribute
this shift in policy, at least initially, to a congressional recon-
ceptualization of tailoring discharge relief primarily with a scalpel
—that is, discharge exceptions for particular debts related to fraud
or misconduct—instead of a hatchet—that is, an absolute bar to
discharge based on the debtor’s fraud or misconduct.71 Yet shortly
after passage of the 1898 Act, Congress confirmed its willingness to
curtail the scope of discharge on the basis of the identity of the
creditor rather than the circumstances giving rise to the debt.
Already having given protected status to tax creditors,72 in 1903
Congress added support creditors—those owed domestic support
obligations—to the list of creditors whose debt was nondischarge-
able.73 This trend continued when Congress enacted the modern
Bankruptcy Code in 1978, which originally excluded nine categories
of debt from discharge.74 Presently, as a result of various amend-
70. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978). The 1898 Act
marked a substantive departure from past bankruptcy laws insofar as the law came to be
viewed primarily as one favoring the debtor rather than a device for creditor collection. See
Tabb, supra note 58, at 364-65. One commentator at the time predicted that, like its
predecessors, the 1898 Act would be short-lived. See Henry G. Newton, The United States
Bankruptcy Law of 1898, 9 YALE L.J. 287, 296 (1900) (“[A]fter [the 1898 Act] has been in
operation for a few years, and most of the insolvents in the country have obtained their
discharge, it will doubtless be repealed, as in former cases.”). In this instance, however,
history would not repeat itself. Instead, the law persisted for eighty years and, although
repealed in 1978, was simultaneously replaced with a new bankruptcy law that has been in
place ever since. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006)). Thus, 1898 marks the
beginning in this nation of a continuously operating bankruptcy law. For a discussion of the
instability of bankruptcy legislation prior to 1898 and the changes that reversed this state
of affairs, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 23-47 (2001).
71. See Tabb, supra note 58, at 368 (“Congress in 1898 did not suddenly decide to be
totally forgiving of fraudulent and dishonest bankrupts; it just wanted to make the
punishment fit better the financial ‘crime.’”); cf. GROSS, supra note 66, at 27-28 (noting that
discharge denial and discharge exceptions “are like bankruptcy’s gatekeepers: they permit
the ‘good’ individual debtors or at least the good debts to be discharged, and they keep the
‘bad’ debtors or bad debts from partaking of the system’s benefits”).
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (repealed 1978). Also included were
debts “for seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation.” Id.
74. § 523(a), 92 Stat. at 2590-91 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006)).
2012] DOES IDEOLOGY MATTER IN BANKRUPTCY? 939
ments to the Code—some the product of lobbying75—this number
has burgeoned to nineteen types of nondischargeable debts.76
Congressional policy has thus evolved to restrain the reach of a
debtor’s fresh start by reference both to the identity of the creditor
owed a debt—for example, tax and support creditors—and to the
circumstances giving rise to the debt—for example, defalcation,
fraud, or an intentional tort.77 Normative judgments regarding the
worthiness of a particular claimant and the worthiness of the
debtor clearly underlie such policy.78 Inherent in these judgments
is the belief that the debtor’s postbankruptcy earnings and assets
will enable him to repay his nondischarged debts.79 Nonetheless,
the concern has arisen that the fresh-start policy may be compro-
mised given the excessive proliferation of discharge exceptions. As
forgiveness of debt becomes more limited, the debtor will exit
bankruptcy with a greater amount of nondischarged debt, thereby
75. GROSS, supra note 66, at 124; 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS 180 (1997).
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006). For individuals who complete their repayment plans,
Chapter 13 provides a broader discharge than the discharge provided to individuals who file
for relief under Chapters 7, 11, or 12. Although the full list of nineteen nondischargeable
debts applies in the latter chapters, § 523(a), the full-compliance discharge of § 1328(a)
excepts only some of those debts from discharge. See § 1328(a)(1)-(4).
77. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-
American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 89 n.99 (1982); see also 1 NAT’L
BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 179 (“Debts excepted from the bankruptcy discharge
obtain distinctive treatment for public policy reasons. Many nondischargeable debts involve
‘moral turpitude’ or intentional wrongdoing. Other debts are excepted from discharge
because of the inherent nature of the obligation, without regard to any culpability of the
debtor.” (footnote omitted)).
78. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1047, 1050-58 (1987); see also, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 142-43 (2005)
(“Congress previously made the policy judgment that the equities of persons injured by drunk
drivers outweigh the responsible debtor’s interest in a fresh start, and here clarifies that the
policy applies not only on land but also on the water and in the air. Viewed from a practical
standpoint, this provision closes a loophole that gives intoxicated watercraft and aircraft
operators preferred treatment over intoxicated motor vehicle drivers and denies victims of
alcohol and drug related boat and plane accidents the same rights accorded to automobile
accident victims under current law.”), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 201-02.
79. See GROSS, supra note 66, at 28 (“The limitations [to discharge] exist because
individual debtors will generate future income through their labor, and this income can be
used to repay the nondischarged debts.”); Boshkoff, supra note 77, at 89 (“If we truly believed
that the debtor had yielded up all her property and that there was no prospect of an
improvement in her financial condition, there would be no exceptions to discharge. But there
is always a lingering doubt, the hope that the debtor can do something for her creditors. This
leads to the creation of such exceptions.”).
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increasing the likelihood that bankruptcy relief will fail to restore
the debtor to economic productivity.80
In light of these considerations, how might ideological prefer-
ences regarding the fresh-start policy affect the decision-making
process of judges in the context of debt-dischargeability determina-
tions? To answer this question, one must realize that, for the
overwhelming majority of such determinations, the judge’s prefer-
ences will be constrained by statutory design. Because the question
presented to the court focuses on whether a debt falls within a
statutorily defined category, the judge cannot expressly base his or
her determination on the debtor’s financial circumstances and
whether those circumstances warrant forgiveness of debt. Thus, the
judge will have to rely on other mechanisms, such as principles of
statutory interpretation or burdens of proof, to justify the direction
of his or her vote. Regarding statutory interpretation,81 some courts
have been inclined to give the discharge exceptions a narrow
construction,82 whereas others have given them a broad construc-
tion.83 As for burdens of proof, the Supreme Court has held that a
creditor must prove the nondischargeability of a debt by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and, in doing so, rejected the more exacting
standard of clear and convincing evidence.84 As another example,
80. See REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1973) (“As for the debtor, while he might receive a discharge
in bankruptcy, because of the large number of nondischargeable debts ... the question is
raised as to how much relief the debtor actually gets.”); GROSS, supra note 66, at 111 (“If,
however, the exceptions become too numerous, they could overpower the rehabilitative
principle, making the exception the rule and the rule the exception.”).
81. Cf. Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation
of Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 237 (2004) (“Appellate judges are likely to be more
receptive than members of Congress or Congressional staffers to careful and well-grounded
arguments by bankruptcy experts. Even under a so-called plain meaning analysis, some
judges believe that context is critical to accurate statutory interpretation and construction.”).
82. See, e.g., In re Pelokowski, 990 F.2d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993); Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso),
978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992); Schweig v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 780 F.2d 1577, 1579
(11th Cir. 1986) (citing Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915)), abrogated on other grounds
by Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
83. See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220-23 (1998).
84. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286-87. In reaching its decision, the Court expressly made
reference to the fresh-start policy. See id. at 287 (“We think it unlikely that Congress, in
fashioning the standard of proof that governs the applicability of these provisions, would
have favored the interest in giving perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in
protecting victims of fraud. Requiring the creditor to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that his claim is not dischargeable reflects a fair balance between these conflicting
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the Sixth Circuit has stated that an award designated by a state
court as being in the nature of support and bearing certain indicia
of a support obligation “should be conclusively presumed to be a
support obligation by the bankruptcy court.”85 
In some instances, however, the statutory framework does invite
a judge to determine whether the debtor’s financial circumstances
warrant forgiveness of debt. Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978, a debtor has been able to discharge his or her student
loans in bankruptcy upon showing that repayment of the loans
would impose an undue hardship.86 Also, from 1994 through 2005,
a debtor could discharge domestic relations nonsupport debt if the
debtor either (1) proved an inability to pay the debt “from income
or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended
for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor” or (2) demonstrated that the benefits of discharge to the
debtor would outweigh the detrimental consequences to the debtor’s
former spouse or child.87 Unlike the other debts excepted from dis-
charge, these debts represent conditionally dischargeable debts—
that is, debts discharged upon the satisfaction of a certain condi-
tion.88 Significantly, this approach deviates from our historical
tradition of excluding conditional discharge rules from bankruptcy
law89 and creates a sui generis opportunity for a judge to exercise
considerable discretion in deciding whether a debtor’s financial
burden justifies a release from prebankruptcy debt.90 Accordingly,
for determinations involving these types of debt, one might expect
interests.”).
85. Sorah v. Sorah (In re Sorah), 163 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 1998).
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history
of this provision, see Pardo & Lacey, supra note 56, at 419-28.
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2000) (amended 2005). Congress enacted Bankruptcy Code
§ 523(a)(15) in 1994. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 303(e), 108 Stat.
4106, 4133.
88. See Boshkoff, supra note 77, at 73-74 (defining conditional discharge rules).
89. See id. at 73.
90. See Tabb, supra note 58, at 363 & n.315 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code section
providing for discharge of student loans upon a finding of undue hardship stands as the
“principal exception” to the bankruptcy court’s limited control over discharge); see also, e.g.,
Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 223-34 (finding judge-specific effects in debt-
dischargeability determinations involving student loans).
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judges’ ideological preferences regarding the fresh-start policy to
play a more prominent role.91
Finally, one should take into account the manner in which the
litigation process itself may affect a judge’s propensity to vote in
conformity with his or her ideological preferences. Because debt-
dischargeability determinations are generally adversary proceed-
ings,92 they proceed much as would any full-blown federal lawsuit.93
The bankruptcy system thus necessitates litigation for relief from
certain types of debts. The irony here is that debtors have generally
sought bankruptcy relief as a result of financial distress. If a debtor
must expend considerable resources to vindicate his or her fresh
start, the litigation process itself could undermine the fresh start.
One might imagine that those who are in the greatest need of relief
will not have the financial wherewithal to hire an attorney.94 They
either will not pursue relief in the first instance, or they will do so
on a pro se basis.95 For those who can afford representation, their
plight may be less sympathetic in light of their wealth relative to
worse-off debtors—especially when one considers the amount of
costs that the debtor will have incurred by the time the case reaches
91. Cf. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. v. White (In re White), 6 B.R. 26, 29 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“It is regrettable that Congress shed so inadequate a spotlight on the
exculpating phrase ‘undue hardship’ .... It is also regrettable that so much is therefore left
to the individual view of each judge who, after all, brings the sum of who and what he was,
what he has become, and what he sees through his own eyes to this basically disagreeable
task.”).
92. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).
93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
94. It seems reasonable to conclude that a contingent-fee arrangement in this context is
highly improbable given that discharge does not result in a monetary award but rather in
a release from personal liability. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2006). Accordingly, this leaves
hourly fees or lump-sum payment as potential arrangements for the debtor procuring
representation. Cf. Robert J. Landry, III & Amy K. Yarbrough, An Empirical Examination
of the Direct Access Costs to Chapter 7 Consumer Bankruptcy: A Pilot Study in the Northern
District of Alabama, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 331, 347 (2008) (“Fees in typical no-asset chapter 7
cases are usually a flat charge, typically paid in advance of filing. The fee covers most basic
services associated with the routine consumer case. Services beyond routine services are
subject to further agreement, likely at an hourly rate, between the debtor and the attorney.”
(footnotes omitted)); Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO.
L.J. 289, 292 (2010) (reporting an empirical finding that “the primary factor that affects the
date on which people actually file [for bankruptcy] is their ability to save up the money to pay
their attorneys and filing fees”).
95. For evidence that pro se debtors who attempt to navigate the bankruptcy process fare
worse than represented debtors, see Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to
Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 19-31 (2009).
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the court of appeals. To make matters worse, debtors, who tend to
be one-shot players, are likely to find themselves litigating against
large institutional creditors—such as commercial banks and the
IRS—that are well-funded, legally sophisticated repeat players in
the bankruptcy system. Because of their resource advantage, and
because of their likely ability to externalize the costs of such
litigation, many of these creditors may be able to force the debtor to
capitulate before trial. For those cases that do proceed to trial, the
parties will find themselves trying their cases under an evidentiary
standard—preponderance of the evidence—not likely to favor either
side.96 The debtor, however, will have the deck stacked against him
or her insofar as the nature of the litigation will be focused on
arguments over debts that Congress has singled out as warranting
immunity from discharge. 
On appeal, legal issues will be reviewed de novo, and pure factual
issues will be reviewed for clear error.97 These standards of appel-
late review are also likely to tilt in favor of creditors. First, consider
the review of legal issues. One might think that, because the review
standard is de novo, both the debtor and the creditor will have a
clean slate from which to argue and thus be on equal footing when
taking their proverbial “second bite at the apple.” But as a result of
the above-mentioned resource asymmetry that advantages credi-
tors, a creditor is more likely to hire an appellate specialist to
pursue its appeal, whereas the debtor will continue to be repre-
sented by the attorney who served as trial counsel. On appeal, trial
counsel may be anchored by the arguments that he or she made
below and may also suffer from optimism bias, with the result that
innovative argumentation will be chilled and the client’s position
may be undermined.98 As for the review of factual issues, winning
96. In its decision holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in
debt-dischargeability determinations, the Supreme Court noted that the standard “results
in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants.” Grogan v. Garner, 498
U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
97. See, e.g., Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar), 260 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2001); Rifino v.
United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2001).
98. See SAMUEL R. MAIZEL & JESSICA D. GABEL, BANKRUPTCY APPEALS MANUAL 1-2 (2d
ed. 2010) (“Many bankruptcy practitioners pursue the appeals from cases where they also
served as trial counsel. Whether this serves the best interests of the client is questionable.
Appellate practice is a specialized area of the law and requires a unique set of skills.
Moreover, in many cases a ‘fresh set of eyes’ is beneficial; counsel involved in the trial may
have lost perspective on the case. Emotions can cloud the very judgment needed to make
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on appeal often is a function of winning at trial. A critical compo-
nent of trial litigation is for counsel to be mindful of the looming
shadow of an appeal and to establish a factual record that protects
the client’s position,99 especially given that the appellate court will
be limited to review of the trial record.100 It seems reasonable to
conclude that attorneys representing well-funded creditors are more
likely to have this mindset at trial than attorneys representing
cash-strapped debtors—if, for no other reason, due to the difference
in the quality of lawyering.101 Thus, if creditors are more likely to
effectively protect their positions at trial as a result of informa-
tional and resource asymmetries, the clearly erroneous standard
will, over time, favor them on appeal.
Finally, in a study focusing on outcomes at the circuit court level,
one must be particularly attuned to the potential selection effect
inherent in a decision to bring an appeal—particularly in the
bankruptcy system with its two levels of intermediate appeal. It
important decisions in an appellate case. Accordingly, many commentators and judges
suggest that engaging an appellate specialist merits consideration.”); cf. David H. Tennant
& Lauren M. Michals, Mixing Business with Ethics: The Duty to Report Malpractice by Trial
Counsel, 20 PROF. LAW. 1, 4 (2010) (“Appellate counsel is in a natural position to review the
adequacy of the record made by trial counsel and to determine if meritorious arguments were
not pressed at all, or were made and abandoned, and, perhaps, even to ask trial counsel,
‘Why?’”).
99. See, e.g., Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1984)
(“To preserve an evidentiary challenge for appeal, the opponent of the evidence must insure
that the trial record reflects ‘a timely objection ... stating the specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground is not apparent from the context.’” (omission in original) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 103(a)(1))); see also Tennant & Michals, supra note 98, at 5 (“In the context of an
appeal, the competence of trial counsel will be front and center in terms of the trial record,
especially in making evidentiary objections and otherwise preserving errors.”).
100. See FED. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2) (“If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding
or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
must include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or
conclusion.”); see also, e.g., Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 969 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“Our appellate review is necessarily limited when, as here, an appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence and rulings of the district court but fails to ‘include in the record
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.’” (quoting FED. R. APP. P.
10(b)(2))).
101. Cf. William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy
as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 397, 406 (1994) (“Rather than making informed decisions reflecting their particular
circumstances and personal goals, debtors are steered to particular choices by their
attorneys. Too often, I believe, those choices reflect the best interests of the attorneys rather
than the interests of debtors themselves.”).
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could be that debtors, in desperate need of financial relief, system-
atically bring weaker appeals than do creditors. If mustering the
resources to litigate the appeal is not too costly, the debtor may
take the view that there is nothing to lose and everything to
gain—most importantly, freedom from debt.102 Or, “given the
pressures of financial distress, ... debtors may suffer from a self-
serving bias which leads them to believe that fairness demands
relief from their debt burden and consequently to overestimate their
probability of success.”103 Yet another possibility could be that a
debtor’s attorney’s economic incentives discourage the attorney
from advising the debtor to abandon the appeal process. Because
the attorney will likely have represented the debtor at the trial
level,104 and because the attorney will likely be paid on an hourly
basis,105 a potential principal-agent problem arises pursuant to
which the attorney will work counter to his client’s interest in order
to further his financial gain.106 On the other hand, the added cost of
102. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 191 (“If the debtor does not litigate, he or she
will be haunted by the specter of a crushing debt load and creditor collection efforts for years
and years.”).
103. Id. at 211.
104. See supra note 98.
105. See supra note 94.
106. See, e.g., In re San Miguel, 40 B.R. 481, 485 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (“[T]here is no
demonstrated desire for repayment of creditors in any of these [Chapter 13] plans either....
In each of the cases now under consideration, the plan is careful to terminate immediately
upon the final installment of attorney’s fees.... The real purpose of the 16 month, minimum
repayment plans here is to avail debtors of the opportunity to defer attorney’s fees, since it
appears difficult to obtain counsel in Chapter 7 without payment of fees in advance.”); cf.
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113,
172 (1996) (“[T]he framing model of litigation poses a powerful role for the attorney. The
attorney can control the client’s frame, thereby influencing settlement decisions in either
direction. The attorney may or may not use this ability to serve his clients’ best interests. An
avaricious defense attorney who works on an hourly rate may portray all settlements as
losses so as to encourage the risk-seeking proclivities of the client.”). For empirical evidence
that the identity of debtor’s counsel can be statistically significantly associated with an
increase in the resolution of a debt-dischargeability determination by trial as opposed to
settlement and with a decrease in the amount of relief obtained by the debtor—that is, the
extent of debt discharged—see Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 220-21. The possibility also
exists that, in addition to the financial-gain motive, an attorney may steer a debtor client
toward certain choices based upon the attorney’s values. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and
Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 509 (1993)
(“Lawyers’ financial interests and social attitudes are often mutually reinforcing. Their
attitudes about proper social role-playing by their clients and themselves may have their
origins at least in part in the lawyers’ financial interests. For example, a lawyer whose
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prosecuting an appeal through an extra layer of appellate review
may deter debtors from bringing frivolous appeals to the circuit
court. Moreover, if a creditor views the appeals process as a battle
that can be won by attrition, this vantage point may encourage
creditors to pursue weaker appeals with the hope that the debtor
will eventually capitulate once his or her resources have been
exhausted.107 The end result will be a settlement pursuant to which
the parties agree that some, if not all, of the debt will be deemed
nondischargeable.
Given these considerations, summarized below in Table 1, we
expect that the outcomes of debt-dischargeability determinations
will skew in favor of creditors. In other words, debtors will have a
difficult time engendering sympathy from a judge. That said, we
still believe that, if debtors do find a sympathetic ear, it is more
likely to be a liberal judge rather than a conservative judge. Thus,
although we expect to observe ideological voting by circuit court
judges, that pattern of voting may not be as pronounced as in other
areas of the law.
practice prospers using chapter 13 frequently has every reason to hold the view that chapter
13 is better for clients’ self-esteem and to develop professional pride in playing a socially
useful role in facilitating repayment.”).
107. Cf. Baker v. Sharpe (In re Sharpe), 351 B.R. 409, 424 n.13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006)
(“Indeed, Ms. Baker—or at least her attorney—knew there was this very large flaw in her
argument.... Plaintiff quoted section 523(a)(2)(A), but left out, with the convenient use of an
ellipsis, the critical phrase ‘other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s
financial condition.’ Thankfully, the court has several copies of the Bankruptcy Code handy
so it could consult the entire statutory provision in addressing this question.”).
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Table 1
The Potential Skew of Outcomes
in Debt-Dischargeability Determinations
Litigation Feature Litigant Advantaged
Procedure Favors creditor
Burden of proof Slightly favors debtor
Resource asymmetry Favors creditor
Informational asymmetry Favors creditor
Standards of appellate review Favor creditor
B. Sample Selection
Given the time demands involved in creating an original dataset,
we faced a choice in constituting the dataset for our study. We could
either focus on collecting and analyzing opinions arising in all of the
federal circuits over a short period of time—for example, three one-
year periods—or we could focus on opinions arising in select federal
circuits over a longer period of time—for example, a ten-year period.
We chose the latter approach so that, in our efforts to identify the
causal effects of ideology on voting, we could take advantage of time
variation in the random assignment of judges, judicial ideology, and
appellate structure. The criteria for selecting the circuits were the
ranking of the ideological composition of the circuit and the pres-
ence or absence of an operating BAP. We sought to identify circuits
at the ideological extremes—the most liberal and most conservative
circuits—as well as those whose ideological composition was toward
the relative center of all circuits. We did so by reference to the
median Judicial Common Space (JCS) score108 among all active
judges in each circuit, other than the D.C. Circuit,109 for each year
during the ten-year study period beginning on January 1, 1999, and
108. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The
Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007). We gratefully acknowledge
Epstein and her co-authors for generously making their JCS data available to other
researchers. See Lee Epstein, Research, UNIV. S. CAL., http://epstein.usc.edu/research/JCS.
html (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
109. We excluded the D.C. Circuit because of the dearth of bankruptcy appeals on its
docket. For example, during the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2009, only
three original bankruptcy appeals were commenced in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR app. at 82 tbl.B-1 (2010).
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ending on December 31, 2008. We calculated both the median and
the mean for the median JCS scores of each circuit during this ten-
year period.110 Table A1 of the Appendix  rank-orders the circuits
according to these scores, from the most conservative to the most
liberal circuit with the JCS scores reported in parentheses. The JCS
scores range from -1.0, the most liberal score, to 1.0, the most
conservative score.111
As set forth in Table A1 of the Appendix, the Fifth Circuit ranked
as the most conservative circuit during this period, whether by
reference to the median median-JCS score or mean median-JCS
score of the circuits during the ten-year period. The Ninth Circuit,
on the other hand, ranked as the most liberal circuit according to
the median median-JCS score and as the second-most liberal circuit
according to the mean median-JCS score. Given our interest in
examining voting behavior in circuits at the ideological extremes,
we selected the Fifth and Ninth Circuits for inclusion in our study.
We selected the Ninth Circuit rather than the Second Circuit at the
liberal extreme because of its continuously operating BAP since
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code; the Second Circuit, on the other
hand, had an operating BAP only from 1996 through 2000.112
Among the four most conservative circuits, none has ever had an
operating BAP.113 Finally, we sought to identify two circuits whose
ideological scores placed them toward the relative center of all the
circuits, one with a BAP and the other without one. We selected the
Eighth Circuit as an example of the former and the Seventh Circuit
as an example of the latter.114
To constitute the sample dataset, a search query was formulated
in Westlaw’s FBKR-CS5, FBKR-CS7, FBKR-CS8, and FBKR-CS9
databases, which contain reported and unreported decisions and
110. For example, the median JCS scores for the Fifth Circuit for each year during the
ten-year period beginning on January 1, 1999, and ending on December 31, 2008, are .41125
(1999), .41225 (2000), .472 (2001), .472 (2002), .472 (2003), .44425 (2004), .44425 (2005),
.44425 (2006), .4165 (2007), and .4165 (2008). The median of these scores is .44425—that is,
the median median-JCS score—and the mean of these scores is .440425—that is, the mean
median-JCS score.
111. See Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 309.
112. Nash & Pardo, supra note 21, at 1779 n.122.
113. See id.; infra Appendix Table A1.
114. Because the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits all have operating BAPs, we were
restricted to selecting only one of these circuits as a result of our criteria of selecting both a
BAP circuit and non-BAP circuit situated at the relative ideological center of all circuits.
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orders relating to bankruptcy issued by various courts, including
federal circuit courts of appeals in the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits.115 The search query consisted of two terms: “11
U.S.C.,” the standard citation to title 11 of the United States Code
—that is, the Bankruptcy Code; and “523,” which is the section
number of the Bankruptcy Code provision entitled “Exceptions to
discharge.”116 The search terms were coupled with (1) a date
restriction that limited query retrieval to opinions issued during the
ten-year period beginning on January 1, 1999, and ending on
December 31, 2008, and (2) a field restriction that limited query
retrieval to opinions whose preliminary field contained the term
“court of appeals.”117 The search query produced a total of 346
documents: 91 from the Fifth Circuit, 50 from the Seventh Circuit,
34 from the Eighth Circuit, and 171 from the Ninth Circuit.
Because most of these documents were opinions rather than orders,
for ease of reference we will collectively refer to the documents as
“opinions” for the remainder of the Article.
The study’s dataset includes both published and unpublished
opinions118 that involve only the resolution of dispositions rendered
by bankruptcy courts in core proceedings involving a determination
regarding the dischargeability of a debt owed by an individual
debtor.119 We included opinions that disposed of the appeal on the
merits as well as opinions that involved solely procedural disposi-
tions, such as dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, dismissal for lack
of standing, and dismissal on mootness grounds. If an opinion
involved both a debt-dischargeability determination and other
115. Reported case law documents are those released for publication in West Federal
Reporters.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006).
117. The preliminary field in Westlaw is found at the top of case law documents and
generally contains the name of the court that issued the document. In its entirety, the search
query was the following: “11 U.S.C.” & 523 & da(aft 12/31/1998 & bef 01/01/2009) & pr(“court
of appeals”).
118. Empirical studies of judicial voting often examine only published opinions. See, e.g.,
CROSS, supra note 4, at 4; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 18. This practice has generated
methodological criticism. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1923 (2009) (“[A]ny assessment of the work of the courts
of appeals that does not include unpublished opinions cannot be seen as complete.”).
119. Note that, as defined by the Judicial Code, core proceedings include “determinations
as to the dischargeability of particular debts.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) (2006).
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matters, only the portion of the opinion relating to the debt-
dischargeability determination was coded.120 Our definition of debt-
dischargeability determination excludes a determination to award
a party attorneys’ fees with respect to the fees incurred in litigating
the determination, whether pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) or
otherwise.121 This situation, however, is distinct from a determina-
tion of whether an award for attorneys’ fees assessed against the
debtor prior to bankruptcy is dischargeable. Such opinions were
included.122 If the opinion involved multiple debt-dischargeability
issues, but the court did not address all of them, only those matters
addressed by the court of appeals were coded. Similarly, if a party
waived a debt-dischargeability issue by failing to offer a legal or
factual explanation of the lower court’s error, the opinion or portion
thereof was not coded. If the opinion involved certification by the
court of appeals to a state court, the opinion was excluded. We also
excluded en banc opinions. Finally, with respect to consolidated
appeals decided by a single opinion, if all of the coded information
produced duplicate observations with identical values across all
variables, then we coded the consolidated appeals in the aggregate.
If, however, the duplicate observations did not have identical values
across all variables, then we disaggregated the consolidated appeals
for coding purposes.
Pursuant to these selection procedures, our dataset consists of
666 judicial votes cast by 133 judges and derived from 222 opinions.
Table A2 of the Appendix sets forth the number of judicial votes in
120. See, e.g., Spoerer Burke 1 LLC v. Feige (In re Feige), Nos. 06-35124, 06-35156, 2007
WL 3210945 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2007) (reviewing matters related to a debt-dischargeability
determination pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523 and denial of discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 727).
121. See § 523(d) (providing for fee shifting in favor of the debtor if the creditor’s complaint
to determine dischargeability under § 523(a)(2) was not substantially justified).
122. Somewhat similarly, if one of the issues addressed by the court of appeals related to
sanctions that were imposed in connection with the dischargeability determination, that
portion of the opinion was not coded. On the other hand, if the issue involved the
dischargeability of sanctions assessed against the debtor prior to bankruptcy, that portion
of the opinion was coded. Also, if one of the issues addressed by the court of appeals related
to the award of postjudgment interest by the bankruptcy court to the creditor in connection
with a debt-dischargeability determination, that portion of the opinion was not coded. On the
other hand, any issue regarding the dischargeability of accrued interest on a nondis-
chargeable debt was coded.
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the dataset by calendar year and circuit with column percentages
reported in parentheses.
C. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses
In this Section, we provide descriptive statistics of our data as
well as bivariate analyses exploring correlations between the di-
rection of a judge’s vote, whether conservative or liberal, and our
explanatory variables of interest.
1. Direction of Vote
To explore the ideology of judging in the bankruptcy context, our
dependent variable focuses on whether the circuit court judge cast
his or her vote in a liberal or conservative direction.123 As has been
aptly noted:
Regardless of the measure of politics used, all researchers
recognize that identifying possible political predilections in the
judging context requires a prior definition of both “liberal” and
“conservative” decisions. To give meaning to the two terms,
scholars look to the identity of the winning party as well as the
claim alleged.124
Conventional coding protocols follow the principle that a liberal
vote favors the “underdogs” or “have-nots,” whereas a conservative
vote favors the “upperdogs” or “haves.”125 In the debtor-creditor
context, a vote for a pro-creditor outcome is generally viewed to be
a conservative vote.126 There are concerns, however, that “the
conventional approach to coding could lead to systematic errors in
the identification of liberal and conservative decisions in the
123. Although a focus on outcome overlooks opinion content, we choose to examine
outcome in order to evaluate the claims of commentators who assert that bankruptcy cases
would not yield ideological outcome-based votes, as do other areas of law. 
124. Staudt et al., supra note 6, at 1801.
125. See id.; cf. Mark J. Roe, Commentary on “On the Nature of Bankruptcy”: Bankruptcy,
Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 235 (1989) (“A persistent strain in American
culture favors the underdog, hesitates to kick someone when he is down (even when he ‘has
it coming to him’), and worships the comeback.”).
126. Staudt et al., supra note 6, at 1801.
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economic context,” including bankruptcy cases, due to the diverse
characteristics of litigants.127 In their empirical study of U.S.
Supreme Court tax cases, Nancy Staudt and her co-authors, using
conventional coding protocols, found a statistically significant
association between the political preferences of the Justices and the
outcomes of corporate tax cases.128 They did not, however, find such
an association in individual tax cases or in the aggregate of all
cases—that is, both individual and corporate.129 The authors sur-
mised that the absence of a correlation was likely attributable to
the coarse coding protocols that could not account for the systematic
diversity of litigants in individual tax cases, thus inevitably leading
to misidentification of case outcomes.130
Given the legitimate and crucial concerns raised by Staudt and
her co-authors, especially when considered in light of our de-
scription in Part II.A of the variety of litigants and disputes
involved in bankruptcy cases, we have limited our analysis to debt-
dischargeability determinations in order to render the definition of
liberal and conservative outcomes more intuitive and consistent
with prior research regarding the role of ideology in judicial voting.
Although we cannot be fully confident that our approach eliminates
the problem of controlling for litigant heterogeneity, we do believe
that limiting our inquiry to debt-dischargeability determinations
largely reduces the problem.
As a historical matter, liberal Members of Congress have tended
to support pro-debtor legislation, and conservative Members have
127. Id. at 1814.
128. Id. at 1817.
129. Id.
130. The authors noted as follows:
Although we can only speculate why the Justices do not appear to be politically
motivated in individual taxpayer cases, we expect it relates to the diverse
characteristics of this group and thus the categorization problems described
earlier. In Dalm, the liberal Justices viewed Francis Dalm as a sympathetic
taxpayer entitled to a refund, but many individuals that come to the Court are
likely to be wealthy taxpayers challenging taxes such as those imposed on
business activities, capital gains, and so forth—challenges that would most
likely not get a sympathetic ear from the liberal Justices. We expect that
grouping all individual taxpayers together and then labeling pro-taxpayer
outcomes as “conservative” had disadvantages for empiricists interested in
correlations between politics and outcomes. In some cases, the decisions are
accurately categorized as conservative, but others should be coded as liberal.
Id. at 1820 (footnote omitted).
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tended to support pro-creditor legislation.131 This pattern of support
was evident during the most recent round of bankruptcy reform,
which culminated in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).132 Much of the
legislation focused on restricting the scope of relief available to
consumer debtors and sought to accomplish this, in part, by
attempting to strip bankruptcy judges of their gatekeeping
discretion in allowing access to Chapter 7 relief.133 As the Supreme
Court noted in one of its first cases interpreting one of the 2005
amendments, “Congress enacted [BAPCPA] ... to correct perceived
abuses of the bankruptcy system.”134 Support for and opposition to
BAPCPA occurred mostly along party lines, with all congressional
Republicans voting for it and 62% of congressional Democrats
voting against it.135 Although the fresh-start policy may not be a
perfectly partisan issue, it is clear that “the questions of who ought
to be afforded [bankruptcy] relief and what the scope of that relief
ought to be are questions that evoke visceral reactions fueled by
particularized views on the ethic of personal responsibility”136 and
131. See SKEEL, supra note 70, at 16 (“Partisan politics have also figured prominently in
bankruptcy history. Much of creditors’ influence has been in the Republican party, whereas
most pro-debtor lawmakers have been Democrats. The political divide was especially
pronounced in the nineteenth century, but the interaction of the three principal forces in U.S.
bankruptcy law and the two political parties continues to be an important theme, even
today.”).
132. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
133. See Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81
AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 479-87 (2007).
134. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329 (2010).
135. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 108, OFF. OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE. OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll108.xml (last visited Nov. 7, 2011)
(listing results for House of Representatives vote); U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th
Congress—1st Session, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote
_menu_109_1.htm (follow “Vote 00044" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (listing results
for Senate vote). For additional evidence that ideology played a role in congressional voting
on a prior iteration of the bill that would eventually be enacted as BAPCPA, see Stephen
Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy “Reform” in Congress: Creditors, Committees,
Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 527 (2004). For
a comprehensive account of BAPCPA’s legislative history, see Susan Jensen, A Legislative
History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005).
136. Pardo, supra note 3, at 643; see also GROSS, supra note 66, at 4 (“[M]ost people are
uninhibited about expressing their feelings, whether based on experience or perception,
about the existing bankruptcy system. When nonlawyers speak about the bankruptcy
system, their commentary frequently takes the form of questions that reveal an underlying
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that those views are likely to correlate with ideological prefer-
ences—with liberals more likely to embrace the concept of forgive-
ness of debt and conservatives more likely to reject it.
We initially assigned one of three values to a judge’s vote:
(1) conservative, (2) hybrid, or (3) liberal. If the judge’s vote entirely
favored the creditor, we coded it as conservative. If the judge’s vote
partially favored the creditor and partially favored the debtor, we
coded it as a hybrid vote. Finally, if the judge’s vote entirely favored
the debtor, we coded it as liberal. In order to explore the extent of
conservative voting, we reduced our codes for the direction of the
judge’s votes to a simple binary value reflecting whether the judge’s
vote fully favored the creditor. This had the effect of subsuming the
“split-the-difference decision making”137 represented by the hybrid
votes into the category of liberal votes and thus left the proportion
of conservative votes unaltered but obviously increased the pro-
portion of liberal votes. As a result of this recoding, approximately
56.2% of the votes were conservative and 43.8% were liberal.138 Put
another way, the odds of observing a conservative vote in our study
are 1.28 to 1. Thus, conservative voting appears to be the norm in
debt-dischargeability determinations but only slightly so.
2. Judicial Ideology
In terms of ideology, we were able to assign a JCS score to the
voting judge for 664 of the 666 votes in the database.139 The median
sense that something about bankruptcy is just not right. ‘Why should someone who runs up
twenty-five thousand dollars of credit card charges be allowed to get out for ten cents on the
dollar?’ ‘Why do banks and finance companies lend to those they knew, or should have
known, could not repay their debts?’”).
137. We borrow this term from RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 128 (2008).
138. Without the recoding, approximately 38.9% of the votes were liberal and 5.0% were
hybrid.
139. Two of the votes in the database were cast by Judge Glenn L. Archer, Jr. of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit while sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit.
The currently available JCS scores for circuit court judges do not include scores for judges
from the Federal Circuit. See Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 312 fig.4.
Approximately 4.1% of the votes in our dataset (27 of 666) were cast by federal district
court judges sitting by designation. We assign these judges the JCS scores provided in
Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data, CHRISTINA L. BOYD, http://clboyd.net/ideology.
html (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). We gratefully acknowledge Boyd for generously making her
JCS data available to other researchers.
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and mean JCS scores in our database were, respectively, .0765 and
.0606. The most liberal JCS score was -.681, and the most conserva-
tive JCS score was .702. Transforming the voting judge’s JCS score
into a dichotomous variable reveals that 51.4% of the votes in the
database were cast by a conservative judge—that is, a judge with
a JCS score greater than zero. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, a
plot of the kernel density of JCS scores in our database reveals a
bimodal distribution with a trough at a JCS score of approximately
.09 and with peaks at JCS scores of approximately -.30 and .43.
Given the positioning of the peaks of the curve, and given that the
portion of the curve corresponding to the negative JCS scores is
steeper and narrower than the portion corresponding to the positive
JCS scores, the plot indicates that the conservative judges in our
database are more conservative than the liberal judges are
liberal—to wit, the median and mean JCS scores of the conservative
judges are respectively .409 and .413 in contrast to median and
mean JCS scores of -.350 and -.311 for the liberal judges. 
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We examine the correlation between a conservative vote and a
judge's ideology using a simple logistic regression model with the
direction of the judge's vote as the dependent variablel4 0 and the
voting judge's JCS score as the independent variable. As set forth
in Table A3 of the Appendix, there is no statistically significant
association between the voting judge's JCS score and the direction
of his or her vote.
To further illustrate the absence of a correlation, Figure 3 below
compares the relationship between the ideology of the courts of
appeals judges and their voting in debt-dischargeability determina-
tions. Only judges with seven or more observations in the database
-that is, judges whose votes constituted at least one percent of the
total votes in the database-have been plotted.'41 The horizontal
140. Coded 1 for a conservative vote and coded 0 for a liberal vote.
141. Approximately 31.6% of the judges in the database (42 of 133) cast seven or more
votes.
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axis displays the judges' ideology as derived from the JCS scores.
The vertical axis represents the percentage of votes that the judge
cast fully in favor of the creditor-in other words, a conservative
vote. The solid line represents the predicted value of the percentage
of conservative votes based on a linear regression of (1) the observed
percentage of conservative votes by the voting judge on (2) the JCS
score of the voting judge.
Figure 3
Relationship Between Judicial Ideology and
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The near-zero slope of the plotted line indicates the absence of a
statistically significant relationship between ideology and voting
behavior in these types of cases. This becomes further apparent
when one considers that many of the ideologically conservative
judges voted conservatively less than 50% of the time and that
many of the ideologically liberal judges voted conservatively more
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Pamela A. Rymer from the Ninth Circuit who, despite being a
moderately conservative judge, voted conservatively in only 14% of
her cases. An extreme example of the latter is Judge Thomas M.
Reavley from the Fifth Circuit who, despite being a slightly liberal
judge, voted conservatively in 86% of his cases. Finally, a difference
of only 20 percentage points in voting pattern separate the most
conservative judge—Judge Edith B. Clement from the Fifth Circuit,
who cast a conservative vote 70% of the time—and the most liberal
judge—Judge Barry G. Silverman from the Ninth Circuit, who cast
a conservative vote 50% of the time.
3. Panel Effects
In order to explore panel effects, we referred to the JCS scores of
the two judges sitting with the voting judge on the three-judge
panel. With these data, we were able to calculate the number of
liberal and conservative colleagues who sat with the voting judge
for 662 of the 666 observations in the database.142 Approximately
24.3% of the votes in the database were cast by judges sitting with
two liberal colleagues, 48.8% were cast by judges sitting with one
liberal colleague and one conservative colleague, and 26.9% were
cast by judges sitting with two conservative colleagues.
In the absence of a relationship between the number of conserv-
ative colleagues and the direction of the voting judge’s vote, one
would expect to see judges in our sample vote conservatively ap-
proximately 56.2% of the time—that is, the proportion of conserva-
tive votes in our database for the 662 observations in which panel
composition could be coded. The data reveal that a voting judge cast
a conservative vote approximately 55.3% of the time when sitting
with two liberal colleagues (No Conservative Colleagues), 58.8% of
the time when sitting with one liberal and one conservative
colleague (One Conservative Colleague), and 52.3% of the time
when sitting with two conservative colleagues (Two Conservative
Colleagues). A chi-square test with two degrees of freedom indicates
142. We were unable to code panel composition for four observations as a result of the
missing JCS score for Judge Glenn L. Archer, Jr. of the Federal Circuit. See supra note 139.
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that the difference between the observed and expected values is not
statistically significant (p = .352).143
4. Federal Regional Circuit 
We control for the circuit within which the appeal arose by
creating four indicator variables for each of the circuits included in
our study. Approximately 8.6% of the votes in our database were
cast in appeals in the Eighth Circuit; 9.9% were cast in appeals in
the Seventh Circuit; 25.7% were cast in appeals in the Fifth Circuit;
and 55.9% were cast in appeals in the Ninth Circuit.144
In the absence of a relationship between the circuit within which
the appeal arose and the direction of the voting judge’s vote, one
would expect to see judges in our sample vote conservatively
approximately 56.2% of the time. The data show that judges voted
conservatively approximately 63.2% of the time in the Fifth Circuit,
57.6% of the time in the Seventh Circuit, 63.2% of the time in the
Eighth Circuit, and 51.6% of the time in the Ninth Circuit. A chi-
square test with three degrees of freedom indicates that the
difference between the observed and expected values is statistically
significant (p = .052).
5. First-Tier Appellate Court
In order to explore the effect of appellate structure on the voting
behavior of the circuit court judges, we control for whether the first-
tier appellate court was a district court or a BAP. Approximately
38.8% of the votes in our database were cast in appeals that were
previously decided by a BAP, with the remainder having been
decided by a district court. Once again, in the absence of a relation-
ship between the first-tier appellate court to have heard the appeal
and the direction of the voting judge’s vote, one would expect to see
judges in our sample vote conservatively approximately 56.2% of
the time. For appeals from district court determinations, however,
circuit judges voted conservatively approximately 60.5% of the time;
for appeals from BAP determinations, circuit judges voted conserva-
143. We use the level of p < .10 to assess statistical significance.
144. See infra Appendix Table A2.
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tively approximately 49.2% of the time. The difference between the
observed and expected values is statistically significant (p = .004)
according to a chi-square test with two degrees of freedom.
6. Bankruptcy Court and First-Tier Appellate Court Outcomes
Given that appellate review standards create an affirmance
bias,145 and given the potential of such bias to constrain judges from
voting their ideological preferences,146 we control for the direction
of outcomes at both the trial level—that is, a bankruptcy court—
and the first-tier appellate level—that is, the district court or the
BAP. We coded the direction of outcome in the same fashion as we
coded the direction of the judge’s vote:147 If the outcome fully
favored the creditor, the outcome was coded as conservative. If the
outcome partially or fully favored the debtor, the outcome was
coded as liberal. Approximately 51.4% of the votes in our database
were cast in appeals in which the bankruptcy court reached a
conservative outcome, and approximately 51.8% of the votes were
cast in appeals in which the first-tier appellate court reached a
conservative outcome. 
Approximately 41.4% of the votes in our database were cast in
appeals in which both the bankruptcy court and the first-tier
appellate court reached a conservative outcome (Conservative-
Conservative); 7.2% were cast in appeals in which the bankruptcy
court’s determination was liberal and in which the first-tier
appellate court’s determination was conservative (Liberal-Conser-
vative); 6.8% were cast in appeals in which the bankruptcy court’s
determination was conservative and in which the first-tier appellate
court’s determination was liberal (Conservative-Liberal); and 44.6%
were cast in appeals in which both the bankruptcy court’s determi-
nation and the first-tier appellate court’s determination were liberal
(Liberal-Liberal).
145. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 48-49.
146. See id. at 55 (“Judges are more likely to affirm ideologically aligned decisions (by
6.2%), showing some effect of ideology. But judges affirm most of even those decisions that
are not aligned with their ideology, demonstrating the considerable power of the legal
deference effect.”).
147. See supra Part II.C.1.
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In the absence of a relationship between the outcomes at the trial
and first-tier appellate levels and the direction of the voting judge’s
vote, one would expect to see judges in our sample vote conserv-
atively approximately 56.2% of the time. Circuit judges voted
conservatively approximately 83.5% of the time in appeals in the
Conservative-Conservative category, 70.8% of the time in appeals
in the Liberal-Conservative category, 17.8% of the time in appeals
in the Conservative-Liberal category, and 30.4% of the time in
appeals in the Liberal-Liberal category. The difference between the
observed and expected values is statistically significant (p < .0001)
according to a chi-square test with three degrees of freedom.
7. Subject Matter of Debt-Dischargeability Determinations
In order to control for differences across debt-dischargeability
determinations—for example, litigant types and legal issues—we
coded the paragraph of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a) pursuant to
which the court of appeals determined whether the bankruptcy
court had made a proper determination. In some cases involving
multiple debts, multiple paragraphs of § 523(a) were implicated. In
some cases involving a single debt, multiple paragraphs of § 523(a)
were implicated—that is, the creditor alleged that the debt was
nondischargeable pursuant to various paragraphs of § 523(a). The
votes in the database were cast in determinations involving the
following mutually exclusive categories:148
• 24.0% in determinations involving only fraudulently incurred
debt (general fraud debt);149 
• 14.5% in determinations involving only debt arising from willful
and malicious injury by the debtor (intentional tort debt);150
• 13.1% in determinations involving only student loan debt
(student loan debt);151
148. We were unable to ascertain the subject matter involved in one opinion in our study.
Accordingly, the percentages reported are for 663 of the 666 observations in our database.
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006).
150. See § 523(a)(6).
151. See § 523(a)(8).
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• 10.0% in determinations involving only debt incurred through
embezzlement, larceny, or fiduciary fraud (fiduciary fraud
debt);152
• 8.1% in determinations involving only certain tax debts (tax
debt);153 
• 3.6% in determinations involving only domestic relations debt for
support (domestic relations support debt);154
• 2.7% in determinations involving only debts arising from
nonpecuniary fines and penalties owed to a governmental unit
(penalty debt);155
• 1.8% in determinations involving only domestic relations debt not
in the nature of support (domestic relations nonsupport debt);156 
• .9% in determinations involving only unscheduled debt (unsched-
uled debt);157
• 20.4% in determinations involving either multiple debts or a
single debt alleged to be nondischargeable pursuant to various
paragraphs of § 523(a);158 and
• 1.4% in determinations not involving any of the aforementioned
categories.
We find a statistically significant relationship between the
subject matter of the appeal and the direction of the judge’s vote for
only two case types: (1) appeals that involved only general fraud
debt and (2) appeals that involved only domestic relations support
debt. In the absence of a relationship between the subject matter of
the appeal and direction of the judge’s vote, one would expect to see
152. See § 523(a)(4).
153. See § 523(a)(1).
154. See § 523(a)(5); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(18) (2000) (repealed 2005). Prior to the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the list of nondischargeable debts included a provision
regarding domestic relations debt in the nature of support that was owed to a state or
municipality and that was enforceable under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. See id.
The subject matter of this former provision is now encompassed within the definition of
“domestic support obligation.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006). Debts for such obligations are
currently nondischargeable. See § 523(a)(5).
155. See § 523(a)(7) (2006).
156. See § 523(a)(15).
157. See § 523(a)(3).
158. Of the 135 observations falling within this class of discharge determination,
approximately 73.3% involved general fraud debt, 71.1% involved intentional tort debt, 55.6%
involved fiduciary fraud debt, 6.7% involved domestic relations support debt, 6.7% involved
domestic relations nonsupport debt, and 2.2% involved penalty debt.
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judges in our sample vote conservatively approximately 56.0% of
the time.159 For appeals involving only general fraud debt, however,
circuit  judges voted conservatively approximately 42.8% of the
time as opposed to 60.1% for all other case types. The difference
between the observed and expected values is statistically signif-
icant (p < .0001) according to a chi-square test with one degree of
freedom. And, for appeals involving only domestic relations sup-
port debt, circuit judges voted conservatively 100% of the time in
contrast to 54.3% of the time for all other case types. Again, the
difference between the observed and expected values is statistically
significant (p < .0001) according to a chi-square test with one degree
of freedom.
We also control for whether the appeal involved an objection by
the creditor to the debtor’s discharge—that is, an objection that the
debtor should be denied a discharge from all debts, including debts
other than those owed to the creditor (Discharge Objection).160 Here,
we anticipate that the presence of such an objection could affect a
judge’s vote in either direction. On the one hand, one could expect
that the presence of such an objection would increase the likelihood
of a conservative vote. Because the grounds for denial of discharge
are generally based on a debtor’s fraud or misconduct in connection
with his or her case,161 such allegations might predispose a judge to
view the debtor in a more negative light than had such allegations
not been made. On the other hand, if a creditor has sought a debt-
dischargeability determination with respect to the particular debt
owed to it and has also lodged a discharge objection regarding all
debts owed by the debtor, a judge may be inclined to look askance
at the creditor’s kitchen-sink approach to litigating against the
debtor.
In the absence of a relationship between the presence of a
discharge objection and the direction of a judge’s vote, one would
expect to see judges in our sample vote conservatively approxi-
mately 56.2% of the time. We find, however, that a judge voted
conservatively only 37.5% of the time when such an objection was
159. This figure differs slightly from the expected value for conservative voting reported
elsewhere in this Section, which was 56.2%, as a result of the three observations for which
the subject matter of the appeal could not be coded. See supra note 148.
160. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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made, in contrast to 57.6% of the time when there was no objection
to the debtor’s discharge. The difference between the observed and
expected values is statistically significant (p = .007) according to a
chi-square test with one degree of freedom.
8. Appellant Identity
Any investigation of the effect of ideology on judicial voting
behavior by courts of appeals judges should account for the party
who brought the appeal. Other research shows that courts of
appeals are more likely to reverse decisions favoring the party who
bears the burden of proof and that the association is statistically
significant.162 As we previously discussed, the creditor bears the
burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the debt owed to the creditor qualifies as a nondischargeable
debt,163 and that standard of proof is not likely to favor either
party.164 For conditionally dischargeable debts—that is, student
loans and domestic relations nonsupport debt165—once the creditor
has satisfied its burden of establishing that the debt qualifies as a
conditionally dischargeable debt, the burden shifts to the debtor to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the condition
warranting discharge exists.166 To control for appellant identity, we
coded whether the debtor appealed the first-tier appellate court’s
decision to the court of appeals. Approximately 54.5% of the votes
in our database were cast in appeals in which the debtor was the
appellant.167 
162. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 52.
163. See supra text accompanying note 84.
164. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Graves v. Myrvang (In re Myrvang), 232 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)
(discussing allocation of burden of proof in debt-dischargeability determinations involving
domestic relations nonsupport debt); Raymond v. Nw. Educ. Loan Ass’n (In re Raymond), 169
B.R. 67, 69-70 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994) (discussing allocation of burden of proof in debt-
dischargeability determinations involving student loan debt).
167. In the absence of a relationship between appellant identity and full affirmance by the
court of appeals, one would expect the court of appeals to affirm approximately 73.9% of the
time—that is, the proportion of circuit court opinions fully affirming the first-tier appellate
court when the unit of observation is the decision of the panel rather than an individual
judge’s vote. For appeals in which the debtor was the appellant, the court affirmed
approximately 78.5% of the time. For appeals in which the debtor was the appellee, the court
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In the absence of a relationship between appellant identity and
the direction of the voting judge’s vote, one would expect to see
judges in our sample vote conservatively approximately 56.2% of
the time. Circuit court judges voted conservatively, however,
approximately 79.9% of the time for appeals in which the debtor
was the appellant and voted conservatively only 27.7% of the time
when the debtor was the appellee. A chi-square test with two
degrees of freedom indicates that the difference between the
observed and expected values is statistically significant (p < .0001).
Further consider these figures from the perspective of liberal
voting and whether the creditor was the appellant. In appeals in
which the creditor was the appellant, the court voted liberally—that
is, either partly or fully in favor of the debtor—approximately 72.3%
of the time in contrast to 20.1% of the time for appeals in which the
creditor was the appellee. Accordingly, we find that circuit court
judges vote against debtor appellants only slightly more often—
approximately 79.9% of the time—than they do against creditor
appellants—72.3% of the time. We can compare the chance of a
favorable vote for creditor appellants with that of debtor appel-
lants by dividing the odds of such a vote for creditor appellants
(.277/.723) by the odds of such a vote for debtor appellants
(.201/.799). The odds ratio (.383/.252) indicates that a circuit court
judge is 1.52 times more likely to vote in favor of a creditor
appellant than a debtor appellant.
Overall, these figures provide additional evidence of the af-
firmance bias documented in our examination of the relationship
between lower-court outcomes and the direction of the judge’s
vote.168 But they also point to a slight creditor bias, which may be
attributable to the manner in which the litigation features of a
debt-dischargeability determination advantage creditors.169 They do
not, however, suggest to us that debtors in our study routinely
brought losing appeals while creditors never or rarely brought such
appeals—to wit, our data show that creditors prevailed at the trial
level only 51.4% of the time and at the first-tier appellate level only
51.8% of the time. In other words, it does not appear that the
affirmed 68.3% of the time. The difference between the observed and expected values is
statistically significant (p = .086) according to a chi-square test with two degrees of freedom.
168. See supra Part II.C.6.
169. See supra Table 1.
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debtors in our study prosecuted appeals that were systematically
weaker or less meritorious than those prosecuted by creditors.
9. Time-Period Controls
To control for potentially shifting attitudes over time toward the
fresh-start policy, we controlled for whether the vote was cast in an
appeal decided during a period of recession as identified by the
Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of
Economic Research. During the ten-year period of our study, 1999
to 2008, there were two recessions: March 2001 to November 2001
and December 2007 to June 2009.170 Studies suggest that economic
conditions affect the voting behavior of judges.171 In the context of
bankruptcy, one might expect judges’ ideological preferences
regarding forgiveness of debt to become more charitable when the
financial distress of debtors is more likely to be attributed to the
exogenous shocks of macroeconomic forces rather than to overcon-
sumption.172 Approximately 18.9% of the votes in our database were
cast when the country was in a state of recession. 
170. See U.S. Business Cycles and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
171. See, e.g., Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and
Judicial Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1219-26 (2009).
172. Cf. Mann, supra note 20, at 3 (“The redefinition of insolvency from moral failure to
economic risk applied principally to debtors who were themselves entrepreneurs in the
changing economy. The criticisms of debt that recurred in various public debates all reserved
their strongest opprobrium for the purchasers rather than the purveyors of consumer goods,
even though both acquired the items on credit. Thus, when Americans began to question the
efficacy of imprisonment for debt and the utility of bankruptcy discharges, their animating
concern was the people who trafficked in credit rather than those who merely purchased on
it.”).
To some extent, the idea of forgiveness of debt as a function of debtor culpability, or lack
thereof, has been expressly incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code. If a Chapter 13 debtor
fails to complete the payments scheduled in his or her repayment plan, the debtor may be
granted a discharge only upon a showing that, among other things, the inability was “due to
circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(b)(1) (2006). Commonly referred to as the “hardship discharge,” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595,
at 392 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6386, the Code clearly commands that
the court deny such a discharge if the debtor bears responsibility for his or her financial
distress. For an example of the considerations that may be relevant in making such a
determination, see Bandilli v. Boyajian (In re Bandilli), 231 B.R. 836, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
1999).
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We also controlled for whether the vote was cast in an appeal
decided subsequent to the effective date of BAPCPA (October 17,
2005),173 which resulted in a decidedly pro-creditor shift in the
Bankruptcy Code.174 BAPCPA amended half of the pre-BAPCPA
discharge exceptions, with some of the amendments more substan-
tial than others.175 The substantial revisions generally had the
effect of expanding the scope of the nondischargeability provision in
question.176 One might expect judges to interpret the Bankruptcy
Code subsequent to BAPCPA’s effective date with an eye toward
173. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 1501(a), 119 Stat. 23, 216.
174. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. BAPCPA represented the culmination
of a decades-long effort by creditor groups to scale back a Bankruptcy Code that, at its
inception, had been decidedly pro-debtor. See Pardo, supra note 133, at 476 (“Bankruptcy law
reached its zenith as a robust prodebtor law with enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.
Immediately thereafter, the consumer credit lobby sought to gain back the concessions it had
made.” (footnote omitted)).
175. See William Houston Brown, Taking Exception to a Debtor’s Discharge: The 2005
Bankruptcy Amendments Make It Easier, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 419, 420, 421 tbl.1 (2005)
(summarizing revisions to § 523(a)). It has been hypothesized that “BAPCPA’s restriction on
the types of debts that can be discharged is also likely to have a larger, negative effect on
minority debtors.” A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 MO. L. REV.
919, 956 (2006).
176. Brown, supra note 175, at 420, 421 tbl.1; Dickerson, supra note 175, at 947-48.
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favoring creditors.177 Approximately 25.4% of the votes in our
database were cast on or after this date.
In the absence of a relationship between voting during either of
the above-referenced time periods and the direction of the voting
judge’s vote, one would expect to see judges in our sample vote
conservatively approximately 56.2% of the time. Circuit court
judges voted conservatively approximately 51.6% of the time for
appeals decided during a recessionary period and 57.2% of the time
during a nonrecessionary period. A chi-square test with one degree
of freedom indicates that the difference between the observed and
expected values is not statistically significant (p = .251). For pre-
BAPCPA appeals, judges voted conservatively approximately 58.4%
of the time in contrast to 49.7% of the time for post-BAPCPA
appeals. The difference between the observed and expected values
177. E.g., Baud v. Carroll, 634 F.3d 327, 356 (6th Cir. 2011) (“We believe it is now clear
that, where each competing interpretation of a Code provision amended by BAPCPA is
consistent with the plain language of the statute, we must, as the Supreme Court did in
Lanning and Ransom, apply the interpretation that has the best chance of fulfilling
BAPCPA’s purpose of maximizing creditor recoveries.”). But see, e.g., Maney v. Kagenveama
(In re Kagenveama), 541 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e will not de-couple ‘disposable
income’ from the ‘projected disposable income’ calculation simply to arrive at a more
favorable result for unsecured creditors, especially when the plain text and precedent dictate
the linkage between the two terms.... If the changes imposed by BAPCPA arose from poor
policy choices that produced undesirable results, it is up to Congress, not the courts, to
amend the statute.”), abrogated by Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010); Jacoby,
supra note 81, at 225 (noting that, with respect to omnibus legislation that would eventually
be enacted as BAPCPA, “Congress did not take heed even of organizations that generally
represented creditor interests, such as the Commercial Law League, of claims that the
legislation would have the opposite effect of that it supposedly intended” (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)); Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory
Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195,
228 (2007) (“Numerous decisions have indicated that the enacted text in BAPCPA frequently
appears to be inconsistent with the purposes of the passage of BAPCPA and often
demonstrates inattentive drafting. Additionally, decisions interpreting the enacted text of
BAPCPA have often reached directly contradictory conclusions, with each decision claiming
to rest on the application of accepted principles of statutory interpretation.” (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)); cf. Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of
Statutory Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 169, 182 (2005) (“Even as bankruptcy
professionals and judges work to implement the statutory changes faithfully and literally,
the nature of legal systems and the details of these particular statutory changes practically
dictate variable and divergent application. Whether the omnibus bankruptcy bill results in
a ripple or a revolution for the personal bankruptcy system will depend on how the
Bankruptcy Code revisions are filtered through the influences of the day-to-day actors trying
to make the system work.”).
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is statistically significant (p = .050) according to a chi-square test
with one degree of freedom.
10. Judge Characteristics
Consistent with prior research that has explored whether the
gender, age, and race of circuit court judges are associated with
their voting behavior,178 we control for these background character-
istics.179 Approximately 76.7% of the votes in our database were cast
by a male judge. The median and mean judges were, respectively,
63.0 and 63.9 years old at the time they voted.180 Approximately
7.1% of the votes were cast by judges in their 40s, 30.0% by judges
in their 50s, 33.8% by judges in their 60s, and 29.1% by judges who
were 70 and older. As for the race of the judges, approximately
81.4% were white, 10.7% were Hispanic, 5.3% were African
American, and 2.7% were Asian American.
In the absence of a relationship between any of the above-
referenced personal characteristics and the direction of the voting
judge’s vote, one would expect to see judges in our sample vote
conservatively approximately 56.2% of the time. Female judges
voted conservatively approximately 58.7% of the time, and male
judges voted conservatively approximately 55.4% of the time. The
difference between the observed and expected values is not
178. E.g., CROSS, supra note 4, at 74-83 (finding for certain case types a statistically
significant increase in the likelihood of liberal voting by female judges, older judges, and
African American and Hispanic judges when grouped together); Pat K. Chew & Robert E.
Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1141, 1143 (2009) (finding a statistically significant increase in the
likelihood of African American judges voting in favor of plaintiffs in workplace racial
harassment cases, but failing to find a gender effect); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles,
Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2008) (finding that minority judges
are more likely to find a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but failing to find a
gender effect); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1774, 1776-77 (2005)
(finding a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of female judges voting in favor
of plaintiffs in sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases, but failing to find a race
effect).
179. We obtained the gender, age, and race data from the Federal Judicial Center.
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
180. We calculated the age of the voting judge as of the date that the opinion was issued
by subtracting the year of the judge’s birth from the year that the opinion was issued.
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statistically significant (p = .465) according to a chi-square test with
one degree of freedom. Likewise, age is not statistically significantly
associated with voting behavior. We created an indicator variable
for whether the voting judge was older or younger than 60 at the
time he or she voted. Judges who were older than 60 voted conser-
vatively approximately 55.4% of the time, and those younger than
60 voted conservatively approximately 57.5% of the time. The
difference between the observed and expected values is not sta-
tistically significant (p = .594) according to a chi-square test with
one degree of freedom.
On the other hand, we do find a statistically significant associa-
tion between the race of the judge and the likelihood of a conserva-
tive vote. We create an indicator variable for whether the voting
judge was African American or Hispanic.181 Judges who were
African American or Hispanic voted conservatively approximately
66.0% of the time in contrast to 54.3% of the time for judges who
were white or Asian American. The difference between the observed
and expected values is statistically significant (p = .025) according
to a chi-square test with one degree of freedom.
D. Findings from Multivariate Regression Models
Here, we seek to provide an analysis of the determinants of
judicial voting in circuit court bankruptcy cases by fitting an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model and a logistic re-
gression model.182 For all variables in the model, negative responses
181. This is similar to the approach used by Cross. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 75.
182. We have chosen to fit an OLS model to ease the interpretation of our regression
results. We recognize that, when predicting the value of a dichotomous dependent variable,
as we do here, an OLS model will inevitably fit values outside the range of the dependent
variable—that is, it will produce fitted values that are greater than 1 and less than 0.
Moreover, the homoskedasticity assumption of the OLS model—that is, that the variance of
the error terms be constant for all x-values—will be violated, with the result that the
standard errors of the coefficients will be incorrect. This, in turn, will result in inefficient
statistical inference—specifically, an increased likelihood that a coefficient, although
unbiased, will deviate from the true value for the population. See JOHN H. ALDRICH &
FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT AND PROBIT MODELS 13-14 (1984). The
advantage of an OLS regression, however, is that the model coefficients can be interpreted
as the effect that a change of a given value of the independent variable in question has on
the predicted probability of the outcome, adjusted for the effect of all other independent
variables in the model. This interpretation is referred to as the linear probability model. See
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are coded as 0 and positive responses are coded as 1. The dependent
variable is whether the judge voted conservatively (Conservative
Vote). Having failed to find evidence of ideological voting or panel
effects,183 we do not include such controls in our models. We control
for whether the voting judge was either African American or
Hispanic (African American or Hispanic Judge) and whether the
judge was 60 or older (60-Year-Old (or Older) Judge). We control for
the circuit within which the appeal arose using four indicator
variables and omit the variable for the Ninth Circuit as the
reference category. We control for whether the first-tier appellate
court was a bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP). We control for the
direction of outcomes at both the trial level (the bankruptcy
court) and the first-tier appellate level (the district court or the
BAP) using the indicator variables Conservative-Conservative,
Conservative-Liberal, Liberal-Conservative, and Liberal-Liberal,184
omitting the latter as the reference category. We control for the
subject matter of the debt-dischargeability determinations using
the indicator variables General-Fraud Debt and Discharge Objec-
tion.185 We control for whether the debtor was the appellant (Debtor
id. at 13.
A logistic regression model, on the other hand, overcomes the above-referenced problems
by producing predicted probabilities between 0 and 1 and by relying on assumptions that are
maintained by the model. But interpreting the model coefficients presents some difficulty
given the nonlinear nature of the model. Because of the nonlinearity, the effect of a change
in one independent variable depends on the values of all other variables in the model. J.
SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT
VARIABLES USING STATA 116 (2d ed. 2006). This hurdle can partially be overcome by using
the model coefficients to compute odds ratios. One can then interpret the odds ratios
associated with an independent variable as the effect that a change of a given value of the
independent variable in question has on the odds of observing the outcome while holding
other variables constant, regardless of their specific values. See id. at 179. The limitation of
using odds ratios for interpretation is that “a constant factor change in the odds does not
correspond to a constant change or constant factor change in the probability” of the
outcome—that is, the predicted probability of the outcome depends on the levels of all
variables in the model. Id. at 179-80.
For these reasons, we fit both an OLS regression model and a logistic regression model.
The models, as reported in Tables A4 and A5 of the Appendix, yield qualitatively and
quantitatively similar results. Accordingly, we suggest that the reader focus on the estimates
from the logistic regression as the more accurate ones, while at the same time considering
the estimates from the OLS regression as approximate indicators of the effect of our control
variables on the predicted probability of a conservative vote by a judge. 
183. See supra Parts II.C.2, II.C.3.
184. See supra Part II.C.6.
185. See supra Part II.C.7. Because we were unable to ascertain the subject matter of the
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Appellant). Finally, we control for whether the appeal was decided
during a recessionary period (Recession) and whether it was
decided subsequent to BAPCPA’s effective date (BAPCPA). We find
that our controls for (1) the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, (2) all
lower-court outcomes, (3) the subject matter of the appeal, and
(4) the time period of the appeal are all statistically significant
predictors of the direction of a judge’s vote. Tables A4 and A5 of the
Appendix set forth the results from our regression models.186
Overall, the models are statistically significant as compared to a
model without independent variables. To assess model fit, we com-
pare the observed and predicted values for a conservative vote.
Using the model equations, we calculate the predicted probability
of a conservative vote for each observation in the models given the
actual values of the independent variables for that observation. For
any predicted probability less than or equal to .5, we classify the
predicted vote as a liberal vote; and for any predicted probability
greater than .5, we classify the predicted vote as a conservative
vote. The OLS model correctly predicts the direction of the judge’s
vote in 77.2% of the observations,187 and the logistic model correctly
predicts the direction of the judge’s vote in 77.5% of the observa-
tions.188 
discharge determination for three observations, the regression models include only 663 of the
666 observations in the database.
186. Our findings remain qualitatively unchanged with different specifications of our
models. These regressions included additional independent variables, such as the gender and
JCS score of the judge, as well as controls for panel composition. Some regressions also
excluded those observations involving a vote cast by a federal district judge sitting by
designation. See supra note 139. For each of the specifications, the model coefficients
remained correlated in the same direction as those we report here. Likewise, the statistically
significant coefficients from the other specifications were the same significant coefficients
that are reported here. 
187. As expected, the OLS model produced some values for the predicted probability of a
conservative vote that were greater than 1 and less than 0. See supra note 182. Specifically,
there were 7 observations for which the predicted probability was greater than 1, with a
maximum value of 1.046; and there were 7 observations for which the predicted probability
was less than 0, with a minimum value of -.070. These 14 observations constituted
approximately 2.1%—that is, 14 of 663—of the observations included in the model.
188. The proportion of correct predictions is referred to as the count R2. J. SCOTT LONG,
REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 107 (1997). The
OLS and logistic models predict the direction of the judge’s vote differently for only four
observations in the model. For three of those observations, the logistic model predicts a
conservative vote, and the OLS model predicts a liberal vote. The logistic model correctly
predicts two of the three observations. For the fourth observation, the logistic model correctly
2012] DOES IDEOLOGY MATTER IN BANKRUPTCY? 973
Of course, without referring to any of the independent variables
in the models, one could correctly classify the outcome in some of
the observations by assigning the most frequent category of
outcome—that is, the marginal distribution of the dependent
variable—to all of the observations. In this case, one could correctly
classify the outcome in 56.0% of the observations by guessing a
conservative vote for all observations.189 Thus, when predicting with
the models that include the independent variables, the error rate
drops by 48.3% with the OLS model and by 49.0% with the logistic
model compared to a prediction based solely on the marginal
distribution of the dependent variable.190
We find several statistically significant predictors of the direction
of a judge’s vote. All of the following estimates of the effect of an
independent variable on the likelihood of a conservative vote are
based on the coefficients from the OLS regression model and the
odds ratios from the logistic regression models, holding all other
variables constant, regardless of their values. First, we find that a
judge who is either African American or Hispanic is predicted to
have a .104 [.028, .180] higher probability of casting a conservative
vote than a judge who is either white or Asian American.191 The
odds of a conservative vote are predicted to be 1.870 [1.162, 3.011]
times greater for a judge who is either African American or
Hispanic than for a judge who is white or Asian American.
Second, we find that, for appeals arising in the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits, the likelihood of the judge casting a conservative vote is
statistically significantly higher than for a judge voting in a Ninth
Circuit appeal. A judge voting in a Fifth Circuit appeal is predicted
to have a .106 [.028, .184] higher probability of casting a conserva-
tive vote than a judge voting in a Ninth Circuit appeal; and a judge
voting in a Seventh Circuit appeal is predicted to have a .113 [.011,
predicts a liberal vote.
189. For the 663 observations included in the models, 371 of the votes were conservative.
190. The proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly
predicted with the marginal distribution of the dependent variable is referred to as the
adjusted count R2. LONG, supra note 188, at 108.
191. We implement the recommended practice of conveying levels of uncertainty by using
the notation [#, #] to indicate the lower and upper bounds of the 90% confidence interval
around our estimates. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the
Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811,
1836-37 (2006).
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.215] higher probability of casting a conservative vote than a judge
voting in a Ninth Circuit appeal. The odds of a conservative vote are
predicted to be 1.945 [1.199, 3.155] and 1.962 [1.067, 3.609] times
greater for a judge voting in, respectively, a Fifth Circuit appeal
and Seventh Circuit appeal than for a judge voting in a Ninth
Circuit appeal.
Third, we find that, for appeals in which both the bankruptcy
court’s and the first-tier appellate court’s determinations fully
favored the creditor (a conservative-conservative appeal) as well as
for appeals in which only the first-tier appellate court’s determina-
tion fully favored the creditor (a liberal-conservative appeal), the
likelihood of the judge casting a conservative vote is statistically
significantly higher than for a judge voting in an appeal in which in
which the determinations by the two lower courts did not fully favor
the creditor (a liberal-liberal appeal). A judge voting in a conser-
vative-conservative appeal is predicted to have a .378 [.205, .551]
higher probability of casting a conservative vote than a judge voting
in a liberal-liberal appeal.192 And a judge voting in a liberal-
conservative appeal is predicted to have a .236 [.039, .432] higher
probability of casting a conservative vote than a judge voting in a
liberal appeal. The odds of a conservative vote are predicted to be
7.483 [2.927, 19.132] and 3.076 [1.063, 8.899] times greater for a
judge voting in, respectively, a conservative-conservative appeal
and liberal-conservative appeal than for a judge voting in a liberal-
liberal appeal.
Fourth, we find that, for appeals in which only the bankruptcy
court’s determination fully favored the creditor (conservative-liberal
appeal), the likelihood of a judge casting a conservative vote is
statistically significantly lower than for a judge voting in a liberal-
liberal appeal. A judge voting in a conservative-liberal appeal is
predicted to have a .145 [.033, .257] lower probability of casting a
conservative vote than a judge voting in a liberal-liberal appeal. The
odds of a conservative vote are predicted to be .449 [.218, .927]
times smaller for a judge voting in a conservative-liberal appeal
than for a judge voting in a liberal-liberal appeal. Put another way,
192. This finding also means that a judge voting in a liberal-liberal appeal is predicted to
have a .378 higher probability of casting a liberal vote than a judge voting in a conservative-
conservative appeal.
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a judge is more likely to vote partially or fully in favor of the debtor
in conservative-liberal appeals than in liberal-liberal appeals.
Fifth, we find that, for an appeal of a debt-dischargeability
determination solely involving general fraud debt, the likelihood of
the judge casting a conservative vote is statistically significantly
lower than for a judge voting in an appeal falling in any of the other
categories of case types described in Part II.C.7. A judge voting in
an appeal solely involving general fraud debt is predicted to have a
.142 [.080, .205] lower probability of casting a conservative vote
than in any of the other subject matter categories for case type. The
odds of a conservative vote are predicted to be .411 [.277, .610]
times smaller in an appeal involving general fraud debt than in
other types of appeals.
Finally, we find that, for an appeal arising during a recessionary
period or for appeals arising subsequent to BAPCPA’s effective
date, the likelihood of the judge casting a conservative vote is statis-
tically significantly lower than in nonrecessionary or pre-BAPCPA
appeals. A judge voting in a recessionary appeal is predicted to have
a .136 [.065, .028] lower probability of casting a conservative vote
than a judge voting in a nonrecessionary appeal; and a judge voting
in a post-BAPCPA appeal is predicted to have a .078 [.013, .142]
lower probability of casting a conservative vote than in a post-
BAPCPA appeal. The odds of a conservative vote are predicted to be
.420 [.267, .660] and .616 [.413, .920] times smaller for a judge
voting in, respectively, a recessionary appeal and a post-BAPCPA
appeal than for a judge voting in, respectively, a nonrecessionary
appeal and a pre-BAPCPA appeal.
E. Interpretation of Results
Our inquiry focused on the role of ideology in the voting behavior
of circuit court judges in appeals involving debt-dischargeability
determinations. Our bivariate analyses demonstrated that there
was no statistically significant correlation between a judge’s
ideology and the direction of the judge’s vote.193 Likewise, we found
193. See supra Part II.C.2. Perhaps this result can be explained by the fact that the JCS
scores may be better suited for operationalizing a judge’s ideology in areas of the law other
than bankruptcy. Cf. CROSS, supra note 4, at 20 (“The available methods for measuring the
ideology of judges and decisions are rough and imperfect. Translating something so
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no statistically significant correlation between panel composition
and the direction of a judge’s vote.194 Accordingly, we failed to find
empirical evidence supporting our ideology and panel-effects hy-
potheses. Without any evidence of ideological voting, our hypothesis
regarding the muting effect of BAPs was rendered moot. Moreover,
although our bivariate analyses demonstrated a statistically sig-
nificant decrease in the likelihood of a judge voting conservatively
in an appeal that was initially heard by the BAP, that association
disappeared when controlling for other variables.195
Our bivariate and regression analyses, however, revealed various
statistically significant relationships of interest. Although we did
not have any formal hypotheses regarding these associations, we
discuss them here as a vehicle for informing future studies of the
voting behavior of circuit court judges in consumer bankruptcy
cases, whether involving debt-dischargeability determinations or
some other type of determination. Our goal is to hypothesize why
we observed these relationships and whether they have substantive
significance, with the hope that these hypotheses will serve as a
basis for new lines of inquiry that confirm or reject the observed
patterns. Table 2 below summarizes the statistically significant
relationships identified in our regression analyses.
amorphous as ideology into a numerical measure for quantitative analysis will inevitably be
imperfect. Moreover, rarely does one have the same ideological perspective on all subjects.
It is relatively common for an individual to be liberal on social issues and conservative on
economic issues, for example. In such a case, a simple single-point measure will miss much
of the individual’s ideological preference pattern.”). It should be noted that our result is
consistent with the finding that Supreme Court Justices have not voted ideologically in
bankruptcy cases involving debt-dischargeability determinations. See KENNETH N. KLEE,
BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 40-44, 53-56 (2008).
194. See supra Part II.C.3.
195. See infra Appendix Tables A4, A5.
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Table 2
Findings from OLS Regression and Logistic 
Regression Models: Statistically Significant Variables
Correlated with the Probability of a Conservative Vote
Variable Direction of Correlation
African American or Hispanic Judge Increased likelihood
Fifth Circuit Appeal Increased likelihood
Seventh Circuit Appeal Increased likelihood
Conservative-Conservative Appeal Increased likelihood
Liberal-Conservative Appeal Increased likelihood
Conservative-Liberal Appeal Decreased likelihood
General Fraud Debt Decreased likelihood
Recession Decreased likelihood
BAPCPA Decreased likelihood
The finding that an African American or Hispanic judge is more
likely to vote conservatively than a white or Asian American judge
raises interesting questions regarding the role of race in bank-
ruptcy. A. Mechele Dickerson has argued that, prior to the reform
of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, white debtors likely received
greater benefits than minority debtors due to the manner, whether
conscious or unconscious, in which the Code had been drafted by
Congress and interpreted by courts.196 She has further argued that,
subsequent to the 2005 amendments, the expansion of the catego-
ries of nondischargeable debt is likely to further exacerbate the
negative effect of the Code on minority debtors.197 Finally, Sumit
Agarwal and his co-authors have empirically documented that
white bankruptcy judges are statistically significantly more likely
to dismiss a Chapter 13 case filed by an African American debtor
than one filed by a white debtor.198 At first blush, our finding that
African American and Hispanic judges were more likely to vote
conservatively seems counterintuitive to the finding by Agarwal.
196. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725,
1726, 1771-72 (2004).
197. See Dickerson, supra note 175, at 956.
198. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Dismissal with Prejudice? Race and Politics in Personal
Bankruptcy 1 (June 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633083.
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Because we do not have information on the race of the debtors in
our study, however, it could be that such information would provide
a plausible explanation for the voting behavior of the African
American and Hispanic judges in our study—especially when one
considers Dickerson’s theory regarding the manner in which the
debt-dischargeability provisions of the Code disfavor minority
groups. All of this points to the need in future studies for a
continued and more comprehensive focus on the role of race in
bankruptcy.
The finding that the circuit within which the appeal arose is
associated with the direction of a judge’s vote may signify that the
law interpreting the Bankruptcy Code in the Ninth Circuit has
generally developed in a more liberal direction than in the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits, thus allowing judges in the Ninth Circuit to vote
more liberally than judges in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.199
The lower-court-outcome findings indicate that courts of appeals
judges are likely to cast votes in the same direction as the first-tier
appellate court. This finding is consistent with commentators’
findings that courts of appeals tend overall to affirm the court
below.200 
On the other hand, the posture of the court of appeals differs
from its posture in the typical case in an important way. In bank-
ruptcy cases, the court of appeals functions not as the initial
appellate court but rather as the second-tier appellate court.201 With
limited exceptions, courts of appeals hear bankruptcy cases only
after they have been heard by a trial court and a first-tier appellate
court.202 In this sense, the tendency of the court of appeals to affirm
the court below differs from what one sees from the Supreme Court,
which, in nonbankruptcy federal cases, generally also hears cases
after a trial court and appellate court have opined on them. Unlike
the courts of appeals in bankruptcy, the Supreme Court usually
199. See, e.g., Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 255
(1991) (discussing the appeal of orders entered in “[d]isputes arising from a bankruptcy
court’s administrative functions” and noting that, “[w]hile a particular bankruptcy court
decision may be held unreviewable in the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, such
a result would not always follow in the Third, Sixth, Eighth, or Ninth Circuits” and that
“[t]he First and Seventh Circuits seem to fall in the middle of the scale of liberality”).
200. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 4, at 48-49, 53.
201. See supra Figure 1.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
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reverses the cases it hears.203 On reflection, however, this distinc-
tion is not surprising. The Supreme Court has a discretionary
docket; in contrast, litigants may appeal cases—even bankruptcy
cases—as of right to the courts of appeals.204 In some sense, the
first-tier appellate court serves the role of traditional error-
corrector. Provided that court is doing its job, the court of appeals
ought to affirm in most cases, which we find.205 
Our findings further suggest, in particular, a tendency by courts
of appeals judges to vote liberally or conservatively when both
courts below—and therefore a majority of judges below, the bank-
ruptcy judge and either the district judge or a majority of BAP
judges—have voted, respectively, liberally or conservatively. This
conclusion is in line with the prediction of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem.206 The Theorem predicts that, when each voter is more
likely than not to vote for the “correct” answer, the result for which
a majority of all the voters cast votes is even more likely to be the
“correct” answer, with the “correct” answer being more likely to
203. See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1150, 1180 n.82 (2004).
204. Note, moreover, that the marginal cost of appealing to the court of appeals after
appealing once to either the district court or BAP is probably not that high. Litigants can
probably rely on the briefs that they filed during the initial appeal.
205. Charles Cameron and Lewis Kornhauser explain that, when judges in a judicial
hierarchy work as a “team” toward the goal of deciding cases correctly and both litigants
know after trial whether the defendant is liable, a three-tier judicial hierarchy is optimal.
See Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selection,
and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 173, 190-91 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006). Under idealized conditions of litigant
selection, litigants will sort themselves out of appealing to the Supreme Court except under
the rare circumstance in which the intermediate appellate court reached the wrong result.
Accordingly, Cameron and Kornhauser conclude that the Supreme Court will hear few cases
but will tend to reverse in those that it does hear. See id. at 188-93.
Though one might question whether litigants know after a bankruptcy court trial whether
the defendant is “correct” or not, the “team model” of judging seems applicable given our
finding, at least at the court of appeals level, of an absence of ideological voting. Still,
Kornhauser and Cameron’s finding seems inapplicable to courts of appeals hearing
bankruptcy cases insofar as the marginal cost to litigants for an additional appeal to the
court of appeals is likely to be small. In the end, the second tier of intermediate appellate
review in bankruptcy may be superfluous unless one is not very sanguine about the ability
of district courts and BAPs to serve the error-correcting function. 
206. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’
Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 1022-23 (2004) (describing Condorcet
Jury Theorem).
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emerge as the size of the panel grows.207 To the extent that the
Theorem applies to votes by judges on legal issues,208 it stands to
reason that a majority of the judges below are more likely than not
to have reached the correct conclusion.209 Accordingly, the finding
that court of appeals judges’ votes tend to align with that majority
is not surprising. 
The finding that a judge is more likely to cast a liberal vote in
appeals of debt-dischargeability determinations involving general
fraud debt perhaps can be attributed to creditors systematically
bringing weaker appeals in such cases. While most debt-discharge-
ability determinations can be commenced at any time,210 a com-
plaint to determine the dischargeability of general fraud debt must
be filed no later than sixty days after the first date set for the
meeting of creditors.211 Perhaps this accelerated timeline compels
creditors to file complaints hastily without giving careful consider-
ation to the merits of their position. This problem may be exacer-
bated further by the fact that the Code creates a presumption of
nondischargeability for determinations involving a certain subset
of general fraud debt—specifically, debt arising from “false pre-
tenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”212 Armed with this
presumption, a creditor may be encouraged to barrel ahead with the
hope that the presumption will provide sufficient leverage to extract
a settlement from the debtor. Although this incentive may be
somewhat muted by the fact that the Code provides for fee shifting
in favor of the debtor if the creditor’s complaint was not substan-
tially justified,213 it seems reasonable to conclude that debtors may
207. Id. 
208. One can argue that at least some legal issues lack an objectively “correct” answer and
thus are not susceptible to the strictures of the Jury Theorem. See id. at 1023. One also can
argue that the Jury Theorem does not apply, at least cleanly, to the extent that judges
deliberate together over how to vote. See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting
Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 113 n.132 (2003). 
209. Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J.
676, 710-12 (2007) (noting that proper application of the Jury Theorem in administrative law
cases should extend beyond judges to “votes” cast by administrative agencies). 
210. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).
211. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (2006) (providing that debt-
dischargeability determination pursuant to § 523(a)(2) must be resolved in the course of the
bankruptcy case in order for such debt to be excluded from discharge).
212. § 523(a)(2)(A), (C).
213. § 523(d).
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not seek to vindicate their entitlement to such fees. It would be
quite daunting and risky to engage in a second round of litigation
with the creditor, only to fail to establish that “the position of the
creditor was not substantially justified.”214 And, even if the debtor
made such a showing, the creditor could still avoid liability “if
special circumstances would make the award unjust.”215 Accord-
ingly, our finding with respect to general fraud debt suggests that
procedure may result in creditors bringing weaker appeals in a
subset of cases, with a resulting increase in the likelihood of a
liberal vote by a circuit court judge.216
Finally, our findings with respect to the time controls seem
consistent with the reasons we set forth above for including such
controls in our models.217 The increased likelihood of liberal voting
in recessionary appeals suggests that judges may be willing to be
more forgiving of debt during times of national economic crisis.218
And the fact that we witness an increased likelihood in liberal
voting for post-BAPCPA appeals, notwithstanding BAPCPA’s pro-
creditor tilt, provides some evidence for the view by some commen-
tators that poor drafting would ultimately lead to unintended
consequences.219 
CONCLUSION
The findings from our study have failed to unearth evidence that
ideological preferences affect judicial voting behavior in a subset of
bankruptcy cases. However, our results do identify several factors
that appear to influence judicial voting. Because our study confined
itself to examining appeals of debt-dischargeability determinations
that arose in four circuits over a ten-year period, it could very well
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Cf. CROSS, supra note 4, at 26 (“Some topical case types might conduce to particularly
liberal or conservative results, for a variety of possible reasons entirely independent of the
judicial ideology.”).
217. See supra Part II.C.9.
218. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 177; see also Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of
Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 917 (2000) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code
is complicated and amendments often have unintended consequences, or fail in part, or,
sometimes, fail completely.”).
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be that our findings are not representative of such appeals in the
same circuits during different time periods or of similar appeals in
other circuits during the same or different time periods. It is also
conceivable that other areas of bankruptcy law may draw out
ideological voting. We chose to focus on debt-dischargeability
determinations primarily because of our reasoned assumption that
such determinations are most likely to prompt ideological voting—if
such voting exists in bankruptcy. Ultimately, we hope that the past
patterns revealed through our empirical analyses will encourage
others to test and reconsider their assumptions and understanding
of judicial voting behavior in economic cases.
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Rank Ordering of Circuits by Ideology from 
Most Conservative to Most Liberal, 1999-2008
Median Median-JCS Score Mean Median-JCS Score
Fifth Circuit (.4443) Fifth Circuit (.4404)
Eleventh Circuit (.3775) Eleventh Circuit (.3788)
Fourth Circuit (.3284) Fourth Circuit (.3173)
Seventh Circuit (.3078) Seventh Circuit (.3161)
Eighth Circuit (.3003) First Circuit (.2788)
First Circuit (.2908) Eighth Circuit (.2765)
Tenth Circuit (.2623) Tenth Circuit (.2623)
Third Circuit (.0625) Third Circuit (.0499)
Sixth Circuit (.0190) Sixth Circuit (.0260)
Ninth Circuit (-.2580) Second Circuit (-.2609)
Second Circuit (-.2905) Ninth Circuit (-.2647)
Table A2
Judicial Votes by Calendar Year and Circuit
Circuit
Year Fifth Seventh Eighth Ninth Total
1999 9 (5.26) 3 (4.55) 9 (15.79) 51 (13.71) 72 (10.81)
2000 21 (12.28) 12 (18.18) 3 (5.26) 63 (16.94) 99 (14.86)
2001 12 (7.02) 3 (4.55) 9 (15.79) 75 (20.16) 99 (14.86)
2002 12 (7.02) 9 (13.64) 6 (10.53) 48 (12.90) 75 (11.26)
2003 27 (15.79) 18 (27.27) 3 (5.26) 18 (4.84) 66 (9.91)
2004 12 (7.02) 9 (13.64) 9 (15.79) 21 (5.65) 51 (7.66)
2005 12 (7.02) 9 (13.64) 3 (5.26) 21 (5.65) 45(6.76)
2006 30 (17.54) 0 (0.00) 9 (15.79) 18 (4.84) 57 (8.56)
2007 12 (7.02) 3 (4.55) 0 (0.00) 27 (7.26) 42 (6.31)
2008 24 (14.04) 0 (0.00) 6 (10.53) 30 (8.06) 60 (9.01)
Total 171 (100.00) 66 (100.00) 57 (100.00) 372 (100.00) 666 (100.00)
  Note: Column percentages reported in parentheses.
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Table A3
Logistic Regression Model for Direction of Judicial Vote
Variable Conservative Vote
  JCS Score .967 (.697, 1.341)
  N 664
  Log likelihood -455.16
  Adjusted Count R2 0
  Note: Odds ratios presented with 90% confidence intervals in parentheses.
Table A4
Logistic Regression Model for Direction of Judicial Vote
Variable Conservative Vote
African American or Hispanic Judge 1.870** (1.162, 3.011)
60-Year-Old (or Older) Judge 1.287 (.901, 1.839)
Fifth Circuit 1.945** (1.199, 3.155)
Seventh Circuit 1.962* (1.067, 3.609)
Eighth Circuit 1.320 (.722, 2.414)
BAP .931 (.607, 1.426)
Conservative-Conservative 7.483*** (2.927, 19.132)
Conservative-Liberal .449* (.218, .927)
Liberal-Conservative 3.076* (1.063, 8.899)
General Fraud Debt .411*** (.277, .610)
Discharge Objection .765 (.405, 1.443)
Debtor Appellant 2.079 (.842, 5.133)
Recession .420** (.267, .660)
BAPCPA .616** (.413, .920)
N  663
Adjusted Count R2 .490
 Note: *** p  .01, ** p  .05, * p  .10. Odds ratios presented with 90%
 confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Table A5
OLS Regression Model for Direction of Judicial Vote
Variable Conservative Vote
African American or Hispanic    
Judge
 .104** (.028, .180)
60-Year-Old (or Older) Judge  .046 (-.012, .103)
Fifth Circuit  .106** (.028, .184)
Seventh Circuit  .113* (.011, .215)
Eighth Circuit  .048 (-.054, .149)
BAP -.010 (-.080, .060)
Conservative-Conservative  .378*** (.205, .551)
Conservative-Liberal -.145** (-.257, -.033)
Liberal-Conservative  .236** (.039, .432)
General Fraud Debt -.142*** (-.205, -.080)
Discharge Objection -.051 (-.155, .052)
Debtor Appellant  .163 (-.008, .333)
Recession -.136** (-.208, -.065)
BAPCPA -.078** (-.142, -.013)
Constant  .296*** (.212, .380)
N 663
Adjusted Count R2 .483
Note: *** p  .01, ** p  .05, * p  .10. Odds ratios presented with 90%
confidence intervals in parentheses.
